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NOTES AND COMMENTS 
"Resolution of Industrial Grievance 
Disputes Under Soviet Labor* Law 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A revolution in socialist labor practice is currently taking place among the 
workers of Poland. In August 1980, Polish workers staged an historic and dra-
matic strike against their socialist employer,1 the state. 2 Regardless of the 
reasons motivating the strike, the important fact is that socialist laborers 
resorted to striking to settle their dispute with their employer rather than nego-
tiating an agreement. The existence of a strike under a socialist system is not 
itself revolutionary. Although far from commonplace in socialist states, strikes 
have occurred from time to time. 3 Yet, the continuing labor unrest in Poland 
• (Editor's note: For the purposes of this Comment, the author will use the American spelling, 
"Labor." In any direct quote, or in the title of manuscripts with the British spelling, "Labour" 
will be dutifully copied.) 
1. "Socialism" is defined as "any of various theories or social and political movements ad-
vocating or aiming at collective or governmental ownership and administration of the means of 
production and control of the distribution of goods .... " WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNA-
TIONAL DICTIONARY 2162 (1976). To many people, socialism is merely the inverse of capitalism, 
which allows private ownership of the means of production. See discussion of socialism vs. 
capitalism in H. BERMAN, JUSTICE IN THE U.S.S.R. 152-67 (1963, rev. ed.) rhereinafter cited as 
BERMAN, JUSTICE IN THE U.S. S.R.l. To Professor Berman, socialism means "the planning and 
operating of the economy by the state." !d. at 346. Under this definition of socialism, the state 
plans and operates every part of the economy. The public is the owner of the means of production 
and the state is the agent that runs the economy. Thus, the state is the employer of all elements in 
the economy, including the labor force. When the workers strike, they strike against the state. An 
industrial strike in a socialist system is therefore different in nature than a strike in a capitalist 
system. See § VII infra. 
2. Original protests began in early July and concerned increases in food prices. The industrial 
strikes in Gdansk commenced August 14, 1980. They spread to several other cities within the 
next week. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 1980, at 8, col. 3; N.Y. Times, Aug. 20, 1980, at 1, col. 6; 
N.Y. Times, Aug. 30, 1980, at 1, col. 6. 
3. A history oflabor strikes in East European socialist states is outlined in Boston Globe, Aug. 
8, 1980, at 8, col. 5. For reports of a widespread strike which took place in 1962 in southern 
Russia, see Boiter, When the Kettle Boils Over, 13 PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM 33-43 (Jan.-Feb. 
1964) [hereinafter cited as Boiter]; .I. KOLASKY, Two YEARS IN SOVIET UKRAINE 190-93 (1970) 
rhereinafter cited as KOLASKY1. A strike among dockworkers in the Ukrainian port of Odessa in 
1961 is reported in N.Y. Times, Jun. 25, 1961, at 2, col. 6. The most recent industrial strike 
reported in the western press occurred in the summer of 1980 in the Togliatti automotive 
assembly plant in Gorky. See N.Y. Times, Jun. 18, 1980, at 31, col. 3. But see the official Soviet 
response to these reports in N.Y. Times, .luI. 7, 1980, at 14, col. 3; 32 Current Digest of the 
Soviet Press rCDSPl no. 25, .luI. 23, 1980, at 9, col. 1. 
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is significant because the Polish workers believe that it is necessary to threaten 
and conduct strikes against the State in order to win concessions. 
The events which have occurred in Poland since the first strikes in the Lenin 
Shipyard in Gdansk! on August 14, 1980,5 raise the question of how socialist 
states settle legitimate disputes that arise between workers and management. 
Unconfirmed reports of strikes are revealed in an interview by Paul Langner with Vladimir 
Borisov, one of the founders of the tiny Soviet free trade union, the Free Interprofessional 
Association of Workers. The Russian acronym for this organization is SMOT. Borisov told of a 
strike among the coal miners of Vorkuta, a mining center near the northern end of the Ural 
Mountains, which was in progress on the date of the interview in mid-March 1981. He al~o knew 
of other strikes in the very recent past, including those which took place (1) in Nikel, a nickel 
smelting center northwest of Murmansk near the Norwegian border; (2) in Vyborg, northwest of 
Leningrad, where workers struck because of police brutality inflicted on some of their fellow 
workers; (3) in Leningrad itself where the strike centered on objections to especially cruel treat-
ment of prisoners assigned to work alongside the strikers; and (4) in the Togliatti automobile 
plant where several assembly lines were stopped as workers sat down on the job. See Boston 
Globe, Mar. 16, 1981, at 9, col. 1. 
In addition, Solidarity, the Polish free trade union, reported that it had heard of a strike in the 
Soviet Union in which the strikers reportedly demanded an independent trade union. See N.Y. 
Times, Sep. 9,1981, at 1, col. 1. 
4. Most important for the purposes of this Comment is the continuing labor unrest itself. See, 
e.g., N.Y. Times, Sep. 30, 1980, at 7, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Nov. 26,1980, at 1, col. 3; N.Y. 
Times, Mar. 21, 1981, at 1, col. 3; N.Y. Times, Mar. 28, 1981, at 1, col. 6. TIME,Jul. 20,1981, 
at 37; TIME, Aug. 10, 1981, at 36; TIME, Aug. 17, 1981, at 34; and TIME, Aug. 31,1981, at 30. 
On October 28, 1981, millions of Polish workers staged a nationwide general strike. See N.Y. 
Times, Oct. 29, 1981, at 1, col. 3. This unrest is of import because it points up the inability of the 
two sides to reach agreement on contested matters. 
An important result of the strikes in Poland is that the right to form a free trade union is of-
ficially recognized by the Polish government. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 21, 1980, at 1, col. 6. The 
Polish workers also won the right to strike. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 31, 1980, at 1, col. 6. Notwith-
standing the recognition of the right to strike, the Polish legislature, the Sejm, came very close to 
officially banning strikes for a limited period during the spring of 1981. See NEWSWEEK, Apr. 20, 
1980, at 46. 
Other significant events which are traceable to the unrest include a shake-up in the higher 
echelons of both the Polish United Workers' Party, the controlling party in Poland, and in the 
Polish government. Party leader Edward Gierek was replaced by Stanislaw Kania. See 
NEWSWEEK, Sep. 15, 1980, at 46. The Prime Minister, Edward Babiuch, lost his position toJozef 
Pinkowski. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 25, 1980, at 1, col. 6. Pinkowski in turn was replaced by Gen. 
WojciechJaruzeiski. See NEWSWEEK, Feb. 23, 1981, at 38. Six of Pinkowski's ministers were fired 
with him. /d. 
At a special Party Congress held in July, 1981, even more changes were made in the hierarchy 
of the Party. Former Party leader Edward Gierek and former Prime Minister Edward Babiuch 
were expelled from the Party. TIME, Jul. 27, 1981, at 30. In addition, only four incumbent 
members of the Politburo, the highest body in the Party, were re-elected to the new Politburo. 
TIME, Aug. 3, 1981, at 35. And fewer than ten percent of the outgoing Central Committee, the 
Party's main administrative unit, were re-e1ected to the expanded 200-seat body. [d. 
Stanislaw Kania, himself elevated to Party boss as a result of the labor unrest, was removed in 
October, 1981. N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1981, at 1, col. 5. His replacement was Gen. Wojciech 
Jaruzelski, tht: Prime Minister. /d. Jaruzelski retained his government post along with his new 
Party position. /d. 
5. For a brief chronology of the events in Poland from July 1, 1980, when meat price increases 
became effective, until August 30, when an agreement was signed by the Polish government and 
the striking workers, see N.Y. Times, Aug. 31, 1980, at 16, col. 6. 
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The fact that labor unrest in Poland has continued into the present6 illustrates 
the depth of the problem which faces socialist employers in Poland and 
elsewhere. Poland's leaders claim that a general strike is suicidal and that it 
would cause the entire economy to collapse. 7 The Polish free trade union, 
Solidarity,8 asserts that union rights are not respected, and that until these 
rights are treated with proper gravity by the state, a strike will continue to be 
possible. 9 
The struggle between the Polish workers and the State does not exist in a 
vacuum. Events in Poland have been monitored carefully by a number of 
countries, including the United States,1O the U.S.S.R.,l1 and some nations of 
Western Europe. 12 Although there are several reasons for the careful attention 
being given to Poland by the Soviet Union, one important reason is that the 
leadership in the Kremlin has similar difficulties at home and seeks to mini-
mize the effect of Polish labor unrest on Soviet workers.13 If there were ways 
for Soviet workers to resolve satisfactorily any and all disputes with their 
employer, the State, there would be no need for a strike similar to those in 
Poland during 1980-1981. Adequate channels for settlement of grievance 
disputes would obviate the need for recourse to a strike. 
This Comment will investigate the dispute resolution machinery in the pre-
eminent socialist state, the Union of Soviet Socialists Republics. a In theory, 
6. See note 4, supra. 
7. See Boston Globe, Mar. 25,1981, at 1, col. 1; Boston Globe, Mar. 30,1981, at 1, col. 3. 
8. The right to form a free trade union was officially recognized by the Polish government in 
an agreement signed on Aug. 30, 1980, see N.Y. Times, Aug. 31,1980, at 1, col. 6; NEWSWEEK, 
Sep. 8, 1980, at 30. To the Polish government, Solidarity has become more than a trade union 
should be. It has become a political opposition group. See 33 CDSP no. 5, Mar. 4, 1981, at 7, col. 
2 (translating and condensing an article published in both Pravda and Izvestia on Jan. 30, 1981). 
The support for Solidarity is widespread among the Polish people. Members of the Polish United 
Workers' Party (PUWP) have joined Solidarity. See 32 CDSP no. 49, Jan. 7, 1981, at 4, col. 1. 
According to one estimate, up to one-third of the membership of Solidarity consists of members 
ofthe PUWP. See NEWSWEEK, Apr. 13, 1981, at 62. Solidarity's leader, an electrician by trade, is 
Lech Walesa. For an excellent discussion of the man and his ideas, see an interview by Oriana 
Fallaci with Walesa in Boston Globe, Mar. 15, 1981, at 1, col. 4. 
Solidarity held a national congress in September, 1981. The five-day meeting called for more 
voice in management by workers and a national referendum. TIME, Sep. 14, 1981, at 53. 
Solidarity also sent a message to other trade unions in Eastern Europe urging them to become in-
dependent labor unions, as Solidarity is. N.Y. Times, Sep. 9, 1981, at 1, col. 1. 
9. N.Y. Times, Mar. 22, 1981, at 1, col. 1. 
10. Boston Globe, Dec. 10, 1980, at 17, col. 1. 
11. Boston Globe,. Nov. 25, 1980, at 1, col. 6. See reports of Soviet military maneuvers held 
near the Polish border in September, 1981, during the national congress of Poland's free trade 
union. N.Y. Times, Sep. 6, 1981, at 10, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Sep. 10, 1981, at 3, col. 4. 
12. Boston Globe, Aug. 20, 1980, at 8, col. 1. 
13. N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 1980, at 1, col. 1. 
14. The author has focused on the Soviet Union for a number of reasons. It was the first 
socialist state and, therefore, holds a unique position among the other socialist states in terms of 
defming and implementing socialism. ·The U.S.S.R.'s labor code has undergone some major 
changes in the area of dispute resolution since it was published in 1918, see, e.,g., § IV infra and, to 
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disputes between labor and management are impossible under socialism; 15 
however, such conflicts do occur. The causes and types of these labor disputes 
will be investigated. Another important facet of the problem is the nature of 
the parties to labor disputes. Hence, the author will consider the positions both 
of management and of the worker who is typically guilty of labor rules viola-
tions. In addition, the author will delineate the unique role played by the trade 
union under socialism. 
An elaborate scheme to resolve grievance disputes has been established 
under Soviet labor legislation. 16 Since major reforms in this legislation have 
a certain extent, the laws of the Soviet Union often are adopted in the codes of other socialist 
states. 
15. According to Soviet ideology, no generalized conflict is possible between workers and 
management under socialism because this is by definition a nonantagonistic society, 
where the differentiation between the two categories is no class-cleavage anyway, as it 
is under capitalism. Managers constitute no separate social class, but merely a 
stratum of the working class belonging, as do the workers, to the trade unions. By this 
theory, any conflict can therefore only be a case between certain specific individuals 
within a certain specific enterprise. It can never take on the character of class conflict, 
nor can it be broadened by class solidarity to result in collective types of action, such 
as strikes. 
A. BRODERSEN, THE SOVIET WORKER: LABOR AND GOVERNMENT IN SOVIET SOCIETY 81 (1966) 
[hereinafter cited as BRODERSENl. 
In the Soviet Union where labour relations are founded on comradely cooperation, no 
antagonistic labour conflicts exist between employees and management. After all, 
both parties are equally interested in improving production performance, socialist 
labour discipline, conditions of work and recreation, and amenities for housing, shop-
ping and cultural entertainment. 
V. GLAZYRIN, V. NIKITINSKY, N. MAKSIMOVA & A. YARHO, SOVIET EMPLOYEE'S RIGHTS IN 
LAW 166 (1978) [hereinafter cited as GLAZYRIN & NIKlTINSKYl. For other comments on the non-
antagonistic relations between labor and management under socialism, see id. 
Soviet theory holds that in a system of public ownership of the means of production 
there are no contradictory class interests to cause labor conflicts. During an interview 
filled with propaganda, and in answer to a question about protection of workers 
against violation of their rights, an officer of long standing in one of the union central 
committees protested, "You always forget there is no one to be protected against." 
E. C. BROWN, SOVIET TRADE UNIONS AND LABOR RELATIONS 179 (1966) [hereinafter cited as 
BROWNl· 
A reason for the theoretical absence of conflict between labor and management is the merging of 
interests encouraged by the regime: 
In the Soviet system the managers are state officials; the labor unions are state 
organs. The director of a state economic enterprise belongs to the union local. Both 
the director and the union chairman are almost invariably members of the Com-
munist Party. In addition, both management and labor receive government assign-
ments and orders concerning rates of wages, standards of output, funds for social in-
surance, and hours and conditions of work in general. By such means the Soviet state 
seeks to merge the conflicting interests, and even the conflicting functions, of 
management and labor into a larger harmony. 
BERMAN, JUSTICE IN THE U.S.S.R., supra note 1, at 346. 
16. In the Soviet political system, the national legislative body of the U.S.S.R. is the Supreme 
Soviet. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, LABOR LAW AND PRACTICE IN 
THE U.S.S.R. 5 (BLS Report No. 270, 1970) [hereinafter cited as USBLS, LABOR LAW IN THE 
u. S.S.R.l. The Supreme Soviet meets infrequently, generally for two brief sessions a year during 
which time it adopts the budget and approves laws proposed by the Council of Ministers, the Ex-
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been made, the author will undertake a brief examination of the historical 
development of dispute resolution in the U.S.S.R. 
Under c,!rrent law, there are three agencies empowered to hear labor cases: 
the Commission on Labor Disputes, Kommissiya po Trudovym Sporam, the local 
factory union committee, Fabrichnii, Zavodskii Mestnii Komitet, and the civil 
(People's) ~ourts. The author will discuss the composition, jurisdiction, rules 
of procedure, method of decision-making and the routes of appeal from deci-
sions of each of these agencies. Apart from these bodies, the author will discuss, 
several other avenues of dispute settlement which are available in the Soviet 
Union. Workers can attempt direct negotiation with management or they can 
write letters which are critical of management to their unions or to the 
newspapers. Management can refer a dispute to a quasi-judicial body!7 in the 
plant for resolution. Independent judicial officers, known as procurators, also 
have the power to intervene. The author also will examine strikes in the Soviet 
Union, in particular the legality and causes of, as well as responses to, work 
stoppages. Finally, the author will address the future of strikes as a tool in the 
hands of Soviet workers, and the extent to which Soviet workers have been af-
fected by the strikes in Poland. 
II. LABOR DISPUTES IN A SOCIALIST STATE 
A. Causes 
In a socialist state, the interests of workers and management theoretically 
coincide. Yet, disputes between these groups still exist. A primary reason for 
such conflicts is an imperfect meshing between goals and the methods of 
achieving those goals. V.I. Lenin, the founder of the Soviet State, realized 
that even under socialism, there would be difficulties with labor disputes: 
rI]n view of the inevitable rise of narrow departmental interests 
and excessive departmental zeal, this circumstance is bound to 
ecutive Branch of the Soviet Government. Id. Between sessions. the Supreme Soviet's largely 
ceremonial functions are performed by a Praesidium which is composed of members drawn from 
the Supreme Soviet itself. Id. The Praesidium may issue decrees which are often later ratified by 
the full Supreme Soviet at its semi-annual sessions. Id. 
Legislation setting out the grievance resolution procedures is contained in Decree oj the 
Praesidium oj the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. of January 31, 1957. This Decree was ratified on 
February 24, 1957, by the StatuJe on the Procedure Jor the Consideration oj Labor Disputes, 1957 
VEDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA SSSR, [VED. VERKH. Sov. SSSR] no. 4, item 58 (Feb. 24, 
1957) [hereinafter cited as 1957 StatuJe on Labor Disputes]. This statute was reformed by the Statute 
on the ProcedureJor the Consideration oj Labor Disputes, 1974 VED. VERKH. Sov. SSSR, no. 22, item 
325 (May 29, 1974) [hereinafter cited as 1974 Statute on Labor Disputes]. 
17. This body is the Comrades' Court, discussed at length in § VI. C infra. There has been 
sharp criticism of the Comrades' Courts in the Soviet press for the failure of these courts to insure 
hearings which are more than complaint sessions. SeeJudges or Comrades? to SOY. LAW & GOV'T 
14t-54 (Fall 1971) [hereinafter cited as Judges or Comrades?]. 
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create a certain conflict of interests in matters concerning labour 
conditions between the masses of workers and the directors and 
managers of the state enterprise, or the government departments 
in charge of them. IS 
However, such narrow departmentalism is not the only explanation of the 
roots of Soviet worker-management disputes. Many Soviet analysts have 
observed remnants of capitalistic consciousness in either or both workers and 
management, 19 and have indicated that such remnants are the seeds of discon-
tent. The underlying capitalistic consciousness, according to this analysis, 
manifests itself in self-seeking, egotistical tendencies on the part of certain less 
responsible workers who try to do less work and get paid more for it. 20 Similar-
ly, vestiges of capitalism21 appear in bureaucratic attitudes of individual 
managers and executives who ignore public opinion, are intolerant of 
criticism, and try to rid themselves of troublemakersY 
There are other causes of labor disputes in the Soviet Union. Inadequate 
knowledge and faulty application of labor legislation due to the lack of 
understanding are two often-cited causes of disputes. 23 Inefficient production 
organization and poor factory administration are other factors which con-
tribute to labor disputes. 24 Finally, there is a growing activism among Soviet 
workers, who are responding to efforts to inform them of relevant labor 
dispute legislation. 25 As a result of these efforts, workers are learning of their 
rights and are developing the ability and willingness to stand against manage-
ment by airing their grievances rather than remaining silent. 26 
18. V. I. LENIN, 33 COLLECTED WORKS 186 (1976). 
19. M. McAULEY, LABOUR DISPUTES IN SOVIET RUSSIA, 1957-1965, at 135 (1969) 
rhereinafter cited as McAULEY]. 
20. R. LIVSHITZ & V. NIKITINSKY, AN OUTLINE OF SOVIET LABOUR LAW 194 (1977) 
rhereinafter cited as LIVSHITZ & NIKITINSKY]. 
21. In Soviet terminology, these vestiges are referred to as "survivals of the past." Id. 
McAULEY, supra note 19, at 136. 
22. L!VSHITZ & NIKITINSKY, supra note 20, at 194. 
23. /d. GLAZYRIN & NIKITINSKY, supra note 15, at 167; Piatakov, Labour Administration by the 
State and Trade Unions in the U.S.S.R., 85 INT'L LAB. REV. 558, 570 (1962) rhereinafter cited as 
Piatakov]. 
24. McAULEY, supra note 19, at 135-36. Weakness shown by the Polish government in dealing 
with potential problem areas lies at the root of the recent labor unrest in Poland, according to Gus 
Hall, General Secretary of the Communist Party, USA. See Pravda, Aug. 31,1980, at 5, excerpted 
and translated in 32 CDSP no. 33, Sep. 17, 1980, at 5, col. 1. 
25. N. ALEKSANDROV, SOVETSKOE TRUDOVOE PRAVO (SOVIET LABOR LAW) 326-27 (1959) 
rhereinafter cited as ALEKSANDROV], cited in Brown, Interests and R(ghts of Soviet Industrial Workers 
and the Resolution of Conflicts, 16 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 254, 255 n. 4 (1963) rhereinafter cited as 
Brown, Resolution ofCoriflicts]; GLAZYRIN & NIKITINSKY, supra note 15, at 167. 
26. This last factor is paradoxical. As noted by the dean of Soviet labor I~w experts, Professor 
Aleksandrov, an increasing communist education of the workers should tend to decrease th~ 
number of disputes as workers come to appreciate their duties as well as their rights. Thus, the 
workers should be less likely to give management a reason to punish them. However, the 
beneficial aspects of this education seem to be outweighed by the activism it produces among the 
workers. ALEKSANDROV, supra note 25, at 326-27. 
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B. Types of Disputes 
Not all disputes between workers and management can be presented by 
workers through formal channels for resolution. Certain disputes must be set-
tled outside the system through informal channels. The basic distinction is be-
tween those disputes which arise out of the establishment or modification of 
working conditions and those which result from the application to already-
existing conditions of relevant regulations. 27 
Disputes which relate to the formulation of working conditions are referred 
to as "non-litigious" (neiskoviye) disputes because the dispute cannot be settled 
through the formal resolution machinery; rather, settlement must be achieved 
outside the established system. 28 The questions raised in such disputes are not 
directly regulated by law, decree, governmental decision or collective agree-
ment. 29 The problems focus on the establishment of certain new rights rather 
than the alleged infringement of pre-existing rights. Non-litigious disputes are 
most often handled in an informal manner, and the majority of these are settled 
at the workshop level. 30 If such non-litigious disputes cannot be settled at this 
level, they are appealed to higher union and management bodies. 31 
Disputes resulting from the application of existing working conditions are 
called "litigious" (iskoviye), because these conflicts are settled through formal 
procedures. 32 Litigious disputes involve the demand for restitution of a right 
that has been violated by the opposing party33 and most often are connected 
with specific features of production. 34 
C. Parties to Labor Disputes 
1. The Worker 
According to a recent Soviet sociological study, 35 the typical worker who 
breaks rules, and thus is subject to disciplinary measures, is a man under thir-
ty years of age who has not completed his secondary education, who has worked 
27. Brandt, Trade Unions in Soviet Russia, 9 CHITfY'S L. J. 233, 235 (1960) [hereinafter cited as 
Brandt1; BROWN, supra note 15, at 202; Zawodny, Grievance Procedures in Soviet Factories, 10 INDUS. 
& LAB. REL. REV. 532, 534 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Zawodny1. 
28. LIVSHITZ & NIKITINSKY, supra note 20, at 205-06. 
29. !d. at 205; Zawodny, supra note 27, at 534. 
30. McAULEY, s'upra note 19, at 171. 
31. BROWN, supra note 15, at 202. 
32. Id. 
33. Zawodny, supra note 27, at 535. 
34. LIVSHITZ & NIKITINSKY, supra note 20, at 198. Examples of such litigious and non-litigious 
disputes might be helpful at this point. Non-litigious disputes include disagreements over output 
norms, rates, job classifications, wage levels and the length of the work-week. Such disputes 
generally arise in connection with the conclusion of the collective contract. Litigious disputes in-
clude those revolving around payment for overtime, during idle time or while temporarily trans-
ferred to another job, and for dismissal for cause. See USBLS, LABOR LAw IN THE U.S.S.R., 
supra note 16. at 33. 
35. 32 CDSP no. 35, Oct. 1, 1980, at 15-16. 
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at the plant for less than three years, who has average or even high qualifica-
tions and who abuses alcohol. 36 This last factor is important because it seems 
to explain the fact that males, more often than females, break labor rules. 37 On 
the other hand, women tend to violate certain specific rules such as by arriving 
late for work or by leaving early to do the family errands. 38 Women are also 
more likely to disobey management's orders.39 A close link exists between vio-
lations of the labor discipline and the conditions and organizations of labor at 
the factory.4o In a given month, 45 percent of all absenteeism occurs in the 
first ten-day period, 28 percent in the second, and 27 percent in the third. 41 
2. Management 
The Soviet factory director bears certain similarities to his counterpart in an 
American plant,42 but his role in industry is quite different from the role of the 
American. The Soviet factory director is responsible, not to a board of direc-
tors, but to the State. 43 He is, in effect, a representative of the State and must 
protect the State's interests.H The director protects the State's interests by 
having a conscientious attitude toward "human relations" in the plantY The 
qualities sought in a plant director include a good knowledge of the technical 
aspects of the industry, a congenial working relationship with his subordinates 
and, above all, an ability to fulfill the State-ordered production plan. 46 
The management hierarchy is composed of a number of tiers. At the lowest 
36. Id. at 16. 
37. Soviet men have a near monopoly on inebriation, and are two to three times more likely to 
break factory rules than women. See Pravda, Spontaneous Workers' Activities in the Soviet Union, in IN· 
DUSTRIAL LABOR IN THE U.S.S.R. 340 (A. Kahan & B. Ruble eds. 1979) [hereinafter cited as 
Pravda1· 
38. !d. 
39. ABRAMOVA, DISTSIPLINA TRUDA (DISCIPLINE OF LABOR) 42 (1969); L. BLIAKHAM, A. 
ZDRAVOMYSLOV & O. SHKARATAN, DVIZHENIE RABOCHEI SILY NA PROMYLSHLENNYKH PRED· 
PRIAITIIAKH (TURNOVER OF THE LABOR FORCE IN INDUSTRIAL PLANTS) 61 (1965); Sviridov, 
Distsiplina truda - vazhneishiijaktor organizatsia obshchestvennogo truda (Discipline rif Labor - The Most Im-
portant Factor in the Organization oj Social Labor), in SOVETSKOE GOSUDARSTVO I PRAVO, no. 12, 15 
(1967), cited in Pravda, supra note 37, at 362 n.H. 
40. 32 CDSP no. 35, Oct. 1, 1980, at 16, col. 1. 
41. !d. This is a result of "storming," the practice of working overtime during the final week 
of a given month in order to fulfill the month's production quota. The workers, having exerted 
themselves so strenuously during the last part of one month, then relax and take time off during 
the first part of the following month. This absenteeism causes the plant to fall behind in its mon-
thly quota, so "storming" near the end of the month is again necessary in order to fulfill the plan. 
See generally H. SMITH, THE RUSSIANS 215-22 (1976). 
42. BROWN, supra note 15, at 175. 
43. !d. 
H. !d. 
45. !d. at 175-76. In Soviet parlance, this is referred to as protecting "the collective" - state, 
management and workers. !d. 
46. !d. at 176. The descriptions of a good director given by a director himself, and by a group 
of factory committee chairmen are illuminating. The director expressed his opinion of the 
requirements of a good manager as follows: 
He must know the economics of the industry and the technology, and put all his life into 
education, mastering the knowledge of the industry. He must not be rude to subordi-
1981] SOVIET LABOI{ DISPUTE RESOLUTIONS 369 
level is the foreman who is responsible for a production section. 47 Above the 
foreman are the shift and chief foremen. 48 Above them, in charge of the shop, 
is the shop superintendent who is directly responsible to the chief engineer. 49 
The chief engineer is the overall production manager. 50 These management 
personnel are recruited both from within the plant, allowing an individual to 
climb progressively up the management ladder, and from institutes of higher 
educationY Before the Second World War, when technical training was not 
as widespread as it is today, 52 the common practice in the Soviet Union was to 
promote from within. 53 This policy provided potential managers with better 
knowledge of the everyday problems of production, as well as with workers' 
attitudes, behavior and grievances. 54 However, a movement towards 
recruiting management personnel directly from educational institutes has 
recently been taking place even if these new managers have little or no train-
ing in management techniques or personnel administration. 55 
A final note concerning the role of Soviet managerial personnel should be 
made. Since directors are employees of the State, there is considerable move-
ment between government service and industry. 56 This job-switching occurs 
in both directions. 57 Also, since directors are often members of the Com-
munist Party,58 movement back and forth between industry and the Party 
commonly occurs. 59 Positions in government or party work and those m m-
dustry may even be held contemporaneously.60 
!d. 
nates, must be able to mix with them, know their life, their requests, their problems, 
think constantly of ways to improve their life. And he must never forget the state plan, 
not only for the year, but monthly, weekly. All this must be combined in one man. 
The union men gave a worker's view of a good director: 
First, he must fulfill the plan. Second, he must work with the people, take their sugges-
tions seriously, know the life of the people and their needs. He must create all good con-
ditions for labor in the factory. Most directors were workers or came from poor 
workers' families, and it is rare if a director has not worked up. So a good director may 
be "chosen" by the people. There are no conflicts between a good director and the 
workers. 
Id. 




5!. ld. at 64. 




56. Id. For example, "The chief engineer at one Leningrad factory had risen from foreman to 
director, then to the department of technology in the sovnarkhoz r the regional economic ad-
ministrative unit]; he was now back on the production side to try to improve an enterprise which 
was having problems." !d. 
57. Id. 
58. BERMAN, JUSTICE IN THE U.S.S.R., supra note 1, at 346. 
59. McAULEY, supra note 19, at 65. 
60. See id., in which the author notes that the director oftheJinna (plant or factory) visited was 
also a member of the administration of the sovnarkhoz. 
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III. THE ROLE OF THE TRADE UNION UNDER SOCIALISM 
According to Lenin, the role of the trade union under socialism is vastly dif-
ferent from its role under capitalism. 61 Theoretically, the purpose of the 
socialist union is not only to protect the interests of the workers, but also to 
participate in the management of production. 62 Unions found their role rede-
fined during the initial decade of Soviet control. 63 This redefinition was de-
signed to accommodate the modification of the function of the union in Soviet 
society. 64 
Establishment of joint bodies to set production quotas and to arbitrate 
disputes was an important step taken by the U.S.S.R. in making unions parl-
ners with management. 65 Such a body, a Rates and Conflicts Commission 
(Rastsenocho-Konfliktnaya Kommissia, RKK) was established at every enterprise 
in which there was a trade union organization. 66 With the introduction of cen-
tralized state economic planning, 67 the "rate" aspect of the RKK 
61. Under capitalism, the function of the trade unions is inseparable from the 
proletariat's class struggle against capitalist exploitation and the restriction of the 
working people's rights. In this struggle, the workers are opposed by all the might of 
capital and of the bourgeois state apparatus. Where socialism is concerned, however, 
the trade unions' protective function is an expression of a "non class" economic 
struggle "against bureaucratic distortions" in the Soviet apparatus ... and "exag-
gerated departmental zeal" ... on the part of individual economic managers who 
are sometimes inattentive to the needs of the working people and to their living and 
working conditions. 
32 CDSP no. 38, Oct. 22, 1980, at 5, col. 1 (citations omitted). 
62. "Participation in the management of production is inseparable from a realization of the 
trade union organization's original and basic function of protecting the working people's rights 
and interests, in the most literal and direct sense of the word." /d. 
63. See generally I. DEUTSCHER, SOVIET TRADE UNIONS (1950) rhereinafter cited as 
DEUTSCHER]; M. DEWAR, LABOUR POLICY IN THE USSR, 1917-28 (1979) rhereinafter cited as 
DEWAR]; M. GoRDON, WORKERS BEFORE AND AFTER LENIN (1941) rhereinafter cited as GoR· 
DON]; S. SCHWARZ, LABOR IN THE SOVIET UNION (1952) rhereinafter cited as SCHWARZ]; J. 
SORENSON, THE LIFE AND DEATH OF SOVIET TRADE UNIONISM, 1917-1928 (1969) rhereinafter 
cited as SORENSON]. 
64. Brandt, supra note 27, at 234. Hazard suggests that "such a change. . . could not but be 
reflected in the labour law. It was but a step to make of the trade unions an arm of the govern-
ment." [d. 
65. This step was taken within the Labor Code of 1922 itself. Four years earlier, in 1918, the 
first Labor Code had been passed. See McAULEY, supra note 19, at 11. In 1922, a more compre-
hensive Code was enacted, the Labor Code of 1922. /d. For background on the Code, see ZHEM· 
CHUZNIKOVA, VOPROSY TRUDA (QUESTIONS OF LABOR), no. I, 23 (1923), cited in McAULEY, 
supra note 19, at 11 n.l. For the Labor Code of 1922, see Kodeks Zakonov 0 Trude RSFSR 1922 goda 
(Code of Laws on Labor, RSFSR, 1922), 1922 SOBRANIYI UKAZOV RSFSR rSOB. UK. RSFSR] no. 
70, item 903 rhereinafter cited as 1922 LABOR CODE]' cited in Zawodny, supra note 27, at 533. 
66. Zawodny, supra note 27, at 538. If an enterprise was too small to have a trade union com-
mittee on its premises, several factories of roughly the same size in the same locale could, with the 
help of the trade union central office, organize a group RKK. /d. 
67. Virtually all parts of the Soviet economy are owned and operated by the government. All 
state-owned enterprises are controlled by the government and the Communist Party through 
agencies and officials at the all-union (federal), republic and local levels. USBLS, LABOR LAW IN 
THE U.S.S.R., supra note 16, at 5. Soviet economic planning and administration is highly cen-
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disappeared. 68 No longer did the unions participate in setting quotas; their 
function became ensuring fulfillment of the quotas set for them. The RKK was 
left primarily with arbitration of disputes between labor and management. 69 
At the same time, however, the unions were inst~ucted not to take positions in 
defense of the interests of their members which would be contrary to those of 
management. 70 The unions have heeded this directive,71 and their action, or 
rather inaction, has led to sharp criticism by workers. 72 
That the unions tended towards complementary rather than contradictory 
positions vis-a-vis management,73 especially after 1928,7+ is not surprising. 
The role of trade union activities is based on the concept of the non-antagonis-
tralized, with basic policy decisions being made by the Party leadership. This policy is then car-
ried out by central government agencies. /d. 
The economy is managed on the basis of national plans which are drafted and supervise!! by 
the central government. These are the "Five-Year Plans." The first Five-Year Plan began in 
1928, and the Soviet Economy is currently being administered by the 10th Five-Year Plan. See id. 
at 6-7; BROWN, supra note 15, at 2-3. 
68. R. CONQUEST, INDUSTRIAL WORKERS IN THE U.S.S.R. 180 (1967) [hereinafter cited as 
CONQUEST INDUSTRIAL WORKERS]; SCHWARZ, supra note 63, at 184. 
69. See text accompanying notes 113-20, infra. 
70. J. HAZARD, THE SOVIET SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT 221 (1980) [hereinafter cited as 
HAZARD]. 
71. Knight, Why Workers Want to Flee U.S.S.R., U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, May 29,1978, 
at 57 [hereinafter cited as Knight]. According to the prosecutor for th~ Moldavian Soviet Socialist 
Republic; the unions' compliance with the ideal of not pursuing narrow workers' interests has led 
some managers to the belief that they can push the unions around. 32 CDSP no. 39, Oct. 29, 
1980, at 9, col. 1. 
72. See, e.g., comments to the effect that union leaders always agree with management against 
the workers, in Knight, supra note 71, at 57. For worker criticism of the unions, see statements 
such as: 
The trade unions and the party administration (in the Soviet Union) are in fact like 
Janus: one body and two faces. The two work together ... to keep a tighter grip on 
the workers and make them do what they're told to do. 
Trade union rights exist on paper in the Soviet Union, but how are they implemented 
and interpreted by the Soviet authorities? The official trade-union movement in the 
USSR is state-controlled, differing very little from their corporate fascist equivalent in 
Nazi Germany, fascist Italy, and Franco's Spain. The links that the union has with the 
secret police and the role it plays in controlling the working mass was overtly displayed 
when Alexander Shelepin was the official head of the trade-union movement in the 
USSR. 
quoted in AFL-CIO NEWS, Oct. 6, 1979, at 2, col. 1. 
73. See, e.g., the reasons for the merging of union and management goals, outlined by Pro-
fessor Berman, supra note 15. 
74. It is easy to understand how the elimination of private enterprise in 1927 resulted in 
the new theory as to the purpose and functions of the trade unions. Since the state is 
the instrumentality of the workers, the workers are only helping themselves when 
they direct their unions to press for greater production. Since there were no elements 
in society with any interests contrary to their own, management became merely the 
agent of the workers in organizing the mechanism to make production possible. 
Therefore, the workers utilized, in theory, their trade unions as their enlightened and 
tutored leadership to show them how to make the best possible use of that which 
management had prepared for their benefit. 
Brandt, supra note 27, at 235. 
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tic nature of relations between labor and management. 75 Hence, the enhance· 
ment of production is for the good of the workers,76 regardless of the immedi· 
ate impact on union members of union acquiescence in management policy. 77 
The extent of union and management cooperation in the U. S. S. R. has led to a 
situation now in which "the most important role of the unions is in support of 
the administration's aim of increasing output. "78 
Socialist unions are also in the delicate position 79 of defending the rights of 
their members while attempting impartially to enforce the labor legislation. 80 
Since 1933,81 the unions have had the duty of supervising enforcement of 
labor legislation. 82 They assumed these supervisory functions from the 
People's Commissariat of Labor which was disbanded that year.83 In assum· 
ing the responsibilities of the former ministry of labor, the unions have been 
adopted by the Soviet policy-makers as the new labor ministry. 84 The unions' 
labor legislation enforcement role has expanded to the point that, second only 
75. Zawodny, supra note 27, at 536; BRODERSEN, supra note 15, at 82. 
76. See, e"f!., a discussion of the concept of "dual functioning" trade unions' (i. e., unions that 
enhance production and protect workers at the same time), in Ruble, Soviet Trade Unions: A 
Changing Balance in Their Functions (Fall 1977) (Ph.D. diss., University of Toronto, Canada), 
cited in Ruble, Factory Unions and Workers' Rights, in INDUSTRIAL LABOR IN THE U.S.S.R. at 80 n.2 
(A. Kahan & B. Ruble eds. 1979) [hereinafter cited as Ruble, Factory Workers' R':f!hts]. 
77. Zawodny, supra note 27, at 536. 
78. D. LANE & F. O'DELL, THE SOVIET INDUSTRIAL WORKER 37 (1978) [hereinafter cited as 
LANE & O'DELL] (emphasis in original). 
79. Hazard speaks of the "unusual position in which the labor union has been placed in the 
U.S.S.R." HAZARD, supra note 70, at 221. 
80. This duty of the unions was emphasized in a resolution passed in 1971 by the XXIVth 
Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The resolution stated that one of the 
primary functions of the unions was to more closely supervise the rules and standards governing 
the protection oflabor and occupational safety. Ivanov, New Codification of Soviet Labour Law, 108 
INT'L LAB. REV. 143, 160 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Ivanov]. 
81. [d. 
82. Fundamental Principles oj Legislation oj the us. S. R. and oj the Union Republics Concerning Labor, 
arts. 96 & 104, 1970 VED. VERKH. SOV. SSSR, no. 29, item 265 (Jul. 22, 1970) [hereinafter cited 
as Fundamental Principles oj Labor]. For a translation into English of the Fundamental Principles oj 
Labor, see 22 CDSP no. 34, Sept. 22, 1970, at 1, col. 1. The Fundamental Principles oj Labor, con-
sisting of fifteen chapters and one-hundred and seven articles, embody an attempt to present "the 
first unified, national statement of basic principles to cover labor legislation and labor relations 
for all wage and salary workers .... " See Brown, Fundamental Soviet Labor Legislation, 26 INDUS. 
& LAB. REL. REV. 778, 781 (1972-1973) [hereinafter cited as Brown, Fundamental Soviet 
Le,f!islation]. For a discussion of the position occupied by the Fundamental Principles of Labor in 
overall Soviet labor legislation, see Ivanov, supra note 80, at 145-47. For a good discussion of the 
Fundamental Principles oj Labor themselves, see Brown, Fundamental Soviet Legislation, supra. For a 
compilation of the labor statutes of the U.S.S.R. and all the union republics, see 1. TAITS, KODEC· 
SI ZAKONOV a TRUDE SOYUZNIKH RESPUBLIK (SOPOSTAVITEL'NIYE TABLlTsr) [CODE OF 
STATUTES ON LABOR OF THE UNION REPUBLICS (COMPARATIVE TABLES)] (1975). 
83. Ivanov, supra note 80, at 160. 
84. HAZARD, supra note 70, at 221. Part of this responsibility is the right to initiate legislation 
which is vested in the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions. Fundarrv:ntal Principles oj Labor, 
art. 96, 1970 VED. VERKH. Sov., no. 29, item 265 (Jul. 22, 1970). For a discussion of the role 
played by the unions in helping to draft legislation, see Brown, Resolution ojCoriflicts, supra note 25, 
at 258-60. 
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to the courts, B5 they are now the most important agency for disciplining 
workers. B6 The unions also are responsible for disciplining senior employees 
who disregard the rights of other workers. B7 
The unions work hard to protect the interests of their members, BB especially 
in the areas of preserving worker rights to a labor contract and to a proper 
wage. B9 The unions often go to great lengths to defend the workers, even 
accompanying a worker to court to insure that the rights of the worker are not 
treated lightly. 90 The actions taken by the unions in defense of workers have 
created an expectation among many workers that their unions will protect 
them. 91 Management, wary of tangling with the unions,92 will usually choose 
to settle a dispute at the Commission on Labor Disputes93 where management 
has a voice in the result. 94 
Another important role played by Soviet trade unions is the promotion of 
worker social welfare. One group of western commentators notes that, within 
very narrowly defined limits, the Soviet trade unions have improved the living 
85. The unions have independent authority in certain areas pertaining to the enforcement of 
labor legislation and the settlement of labor disputes. See Khitrov, The Role of Management and 
Workers in Raising the Efficiency of Soviet Industry, 111 INT'L LAB. REV. 507, 520 (1975) [hereinafter 
cited as Khitrov]. 
86. BRODERSEN, supra note 15, at 82. An indication of the importance of the unions in resolv-
ing disputes and of the deference shown by the courts to unions' decisions is that, although both 
workers and management have the right to appeal decisions of the local union committee to 
court, the judge will, in the normal course of events, accept the decision of the union committee. 
Ruble, Factory Workers' Rights, supra note 76, at 60. 
87. In the first half of 1972 alone, at the request of the unions, 559 persons were removed from 
their posts for failure to comply with the legislation governing the protertion of workers in 
Kazakhstan alone. See Ivanov, supra note 80, at 160. For a collection of cases in which objection-
able directors were removed at the insistence of the unions, see Brown, Lahar Rdalions in Soviet Fac-
tories, 11 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 183, 199 n.40 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Brown, Labor Rela-
tions]; Brown, Resolution oj Conflicts, supra note 25, at 269-70. 
88. V. ZAICHIKOV, USSR: TRADE UNION ACTIVITY 84 (1977) [hereinafter cited as 
ZAICHIKovj. 
89. Ruble, Factory Workers' Rights, supra note 76, at 79. 
90. ZAICHIKOV, supra note 88, at 84. In court, the union representative has the right to 
familiarize himself with the materials of the case, to raise any object ion, to provide explanations, 
to present evidence and to engage in any other lawful activity. Id. It is said that the unions do not 
go to court for their members often enough. Sf( Brown, Re.lollliioll 01' Conflicts, supra note 25, at 
273. 
91. According to a Soviet analyst, it is not uncommon to hear workers threatening, quite con-
fidently, to go to the unions to settle a conflict. V. SMO\.IARCHUK, OKHRANA TRUDOVYKH PRAV 
RABOCHIKH I SLUZHASHCHIKH (THE DEFENSE OF LAIlOR RIGHTS OF WORKERS AND EMPLOYEES) 
(1970) [hereinafter cited as SMOLIARCHUKj, cited in Kiralfy, Labor Law Reform Since the Death ~I' 
Stalin, in CONTEMPORARY SOVIET LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JOHN N. HAZARD 165 (D. D. 
Barryed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as Kiralfyj. 
92. HAZARD, supra note 70, at 222. 
93. See § V.A infra. 
94. Another explanation for this fact might be that, because union leadership has been so 
thoroughly absorbed into the state apparatus, state managers ordinarily do not fear bias against 
them in the KTS hearings. HAZARD, supra note 70, at 221-22; BROWN, supra note 15, at 210-11. 
In fact, a union committee chairman claimed that "management usually gives up at the first 
step." Id. at 211. 
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and working conditions of their members.95 Even though the Soviet trade 
unions have abandoned the role of defending the rights of workers against the 
..rights of the employer, 96 the unions still retain certain welfare promotion func-
tions through which they attempt to better the condition of their members. 97 
I¥. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION LEGISLATION 
A. Pre-1928 
The law oflabor dispute resolution in the U.S.S.R. is based on Section V of 
the 1922 Labor Code.98 The Labor Code was published during the period of 
the New Economic Policy in Soviet Russia,99 and some of its provisions reflect 
the more relaxed official attitude toward unions at that time. 100 In particular, 
unions were expected to be agencies relatively independent of the state and of 
the Party, 101 working to better the conditions of their members. 102 An impor-
tant vehicle for achieving this end was the right to strike. lOS Although the 
unions were not denied this right,104 they were exhorted to use a strike only as 
a last resort,105 when all other means of achieving their rightful claims were ex-
hausted. l06 
95. Id. DEUTSCHER, supra note 63; McAuLEY, supra note 19; L. DE BELLCOMBE, LES CONVEN-
TIONS COLLECTIVES DE TRAVAIL EN UNION SOVETIQUE (1958); T. LOWIT, LE SYNDICALISME DE 
TYPE SOVIETIQUE (1971); Morrell, Communist Unionism: Organized Labor and the Soviet 
State, (1965) (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1965), cited in INDUSTRIAL LABOR IN THE 
U.S.S.R. 80 n.4 (A. Kahan & B. Ruble eds. 1979) [hereinafter cited as Morrell). 
96. BRODERSEN, supra note 15, at 82. 
97. For a discussion of the role the union plays in protecting the welfare of its members, see 
Madison, Trade Unions and Social Welfare, in INDUSTRIAL LABOR IN THE U.S.S.R. 85-115 (A. 
Kahan & B. Ruble eds. 1979). 
98. 1922 SOB. UK. RSFSR, no. 70, item 903. 
99. The New Economic Policy (NEP) lasted from 1921-1928. DEUTSCHER, supra note 63, at 
66. It provided for a mixed, socialist-capitalist economy. [d. at 59. A degree of private enterprise 
was readmitted to the economy. DEWAR, supra note 63, at 102. NEP was "an attempt to rebuild 
and expand the economy on the basis of both public and private ownership, to curb the very 
serious inflation and re-establish a stable currency." McAuLEY, supra note 19, at 10. 
100. Brandt, supra note 27, at 234. 
101. DEUTSCHER, supra note 63, at 67. 
102. Id. Brandt, supra note 27, at 234. 
103. GORDON, supra note 63, at 93; DEWAR, supra note 63, at 102 n.3; SORENSON, supra note 
63, at 219. 
104. DEUTSCHER, supra note 63, at 72; DEWAR, supra note 63, at 102. 
105. DEWAR, supra note 63, at 103; INT'L LABOR ORGANIZATION, THE TRADE UNION SITUA-
TION IN THE U.S.S.R. 63 (1960) [hereinafter cited as ILO, THE TRADE UNION SITUATION). 
106. Id. at 64; DEUTSCHER, supra note 63, at 72; DEWAR, supra note 63, at 105. Just because 
the unions were encouraged to find means other than strikes of resolving disputes does not mean 
that no strikes were called by the unions during NEP. For example, in 1921-1922, 102 strikes 
involving 43,000 workers were reported. SORENSON, supra note 63, at 219. In 1924, 267 strikes in-
volving 42,000 workers were reported. [d. In 1925, there were 186 strikes involving 43,000 
workers; however, none of these strikes were sanctioned by the unions. Id. In 1926, 32,900 
workers participated in 327 strikes, and in 1927, 20,100 workers in 396 strikes. [d. The first half 
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B. 1928-1957 
With the period of rapid industrialization that was initiated in 1928 in the 
u. S. S. R. , 107 certain changes were necessary. In order to build a successful 
socialist state in the shortest possible time, protracted work stoppages had to 
be kept to a minimum. lOS Therefore, while the strike as a means of settling 
legitimate disputes was not outlawed per se, the unions cooperated with the 
State in limiting its use. 109 Although there are indications that strikes were not 
illegal as late as 1929,110 no major strikes have been called by the unions since 
the days of the New Economic Policy.ll1 
More important than the question of legality of strikes during this period 
was the institution of the RKK.1l2 The RKK was intended to set the perform-
ance quota of the enterprise in which the RKK was located by obtaining agree-
ments between the management and the union.113 The RKK's functions in 
this area became superfluous in 1928 with the introduction of central 
economic planning by the state. 114 Thus, after 1933, the RKK's duties were 
limited to "familiarization of the workers with the norms, mobilization of 
workers for their fulfillment, and similar tasks. "115 The substance of the rates 
and norms could only be considered if they violated the collective 
agreement. 116 
The RKK within a given factory was composed of equal numbers of union 
representatives and of management. ll7 Not a sitting body, the RKK was 
assembled anew for each dispute brought before it. 118 All possible benefits of 
stability and predictability in decision-making were therefore lost. Appeal 
from a decision of the RKK was brought before a higher union body, such as 
the city- or republic-wide union authorities, 119 or, ·in some cases, the courts. 120 
The RKK did not effectively handle the disputes which arose throughout 
of 1928 saw 90 strikes involving 8,900 workers occur. /d. The strike was not a universally success-
ful weapon for the workers, however. In 1926 and 1927, the workers won approximately one-
third and lost two-thirds of the strikes held. /d. 
107. GORDON, supra note 63, at 98. 
108. See generally Brandt, supra note 27, at 234. 
109. ILO, THE TRADE UNION SITUATION, supra note 105, at 64. 
110. E.g., strike funds were protected, implying the legality of strikes. See Decree of January 
23, 1929, cited in ILO, THE TRADE UNION SITUATION, supra note 105, at 63. 
111. USBLS, LABOR LAW IN THE U.S.S.R., supra note 16, at 33. 
112. For a good discussion of the workings of the RKK, see Zawodny, supra note 27, at 
538-541; McAULEY, supra note 19, at 20-26. 
113. /d. at 13. 
114. See text accompanying notes 67-69, supra. 
115. CONQUEST, supra note 68, at 180. 
116. /d. 
117. Zawodny, supra note 27, at 538. 
118. Id. 
119. /d. at 547. Int'l Labor Organization, Industrial Relations in the US.S.R., 17 IND. & LAB. 
344, 344 (1957) [hereinafter cited as ILO, Industrial Relations]. 
120. Zawodny, supra note 27, at 542-43; Brown, Labor Relations, supra note 87, at 199. 
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Soviet industry. 121 Therefore, in 1957, the machinery for resolving these con-
flicts was overhauled. 122 
C. The Riform of 1957 
By the Decree of January 31, 1957,123 the Supreme Soviet, the legislature of 
the U.S.S.R., established a new system for settling disputes. m Under this 
Decree, assuming that a worker was not able to resolve his problem through 
informal channels,125 he could turn to the committee within the factory 
authorized to hear labor disputes, the Kommissiya po Trudovym Sporam (KTS). 
Like the RKK which functioned before it, the KTS is composed of equal 
numbers of management and union representatives. 126 Appeals are first 
routed to the factory union committee.'27 A worker can then appeal a decision 
of the union committee to the courts. 128 
The major objective of this reform was "to enable any worker to obtain, in 
dubious and controversial cases, everything he is entitled to, speedily and 
without red tape." 129 This change also brought the resolution machinery 
much closer to the individual worker. 130 The new procedures placed much of 
the final decision-making power in the hands of a union committee at the fac-
tory131 rather than leaving this power in the hands of union authorities132 who 
are far removed from the controversy and from the parties involved. 133 The 
design of decision-making in local hands was to provide more protection for 
the individual worker .134 A local union is less apt merely to go along with man-
121. Brown, Labor Relations, supra note 87, at 199; ILO, Industrial Relations, supra note 119, at 
344-45. 
122. CONQUEST, INDUSTRIAL WORKERS, supra note 68, at 180; ILO, THE TRADE UNION 
SITUATION, supra note 105, at 62. 
123. Decree of the Praesidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.,January 31,1957. The 
Decree was ratified by the 1957 Statute on Labor Disputes, 1957 VED. VERKH. Sov. SSSR, no. 4, 
item 58. 
124. Brown, Labor Relations, supra note 87, at 200. 
125. LIVSHITZ & NIKITINSKY, supra note 20, at 199; GLAZYRIN & NIKITINSKY, supra note 15, at 
171. See § VI infra. 
126. LIVSHITZ & NIKITINSKY, supra nqte 20, at 197; CONQUEST, INDUSTRIAL WORKERS, supra 
note 68, at 180. 
127. LIVSHITZ & NIKITINSKY, supra note 20, at 200. 
128. GLAZYRIN & NIKITINSKY, supra note 15, at 175. 
129. Trud, Feb. 14, 1957, translated in 9 CDSP, no. 7, Mar. 27,1957, at 36-37. 
130. Ruble, The Soviet-American Comparison: A High Risk Venture, 2 COMPo LAB. LAW. 247, 254 
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Ruble, Comparison]; ILO, Industrial Relations, supra note 119, at 345. 
131. Brown, Labor Relations, supra note 87, at 200. 
132. USBLS, LABOR LAW IN THE U.S.S.R., supra note 16, at 34. 
133. Id. 
134. Id. Kahl, The Worker, 14 PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM, no. 1, 97 (Mar.-Apr. 1965) 
[hereinafter cited as Kahl]. 
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agement l35 than are the higher union bodies which function "more as man-
agement-minded agents of the government than as representatives of the 
workers. "136 
D. The Legislation of 1971: 
Labor procedures were further refined on May 20, 1974 when the Supreme 
Soviet adopted a resolution that brought the settlement machinery still closer 
to the worker.137 This reform created shop KTSs to which most disputes are 
referred, with appeal to shop union committees. 138 If the dispute is such as to 
have enterprise-wide ramifications, the dispute can be taken directly to the 
enterprise KTS and, then, can be appealed to the enterprise union 
committee. 139 This reform changed the former procedure which had, general-
ly, resulted in a bypass of the shop institutions by replacing those procedures 
with the more direct approach of the factory-wide institutions. 140 Due to the 
movement of the dispute resolution to a position which is more proximate to 
the worker, the worker theoretically should receive fairer treatment because 
the people on the shop KTS and on the union committee would tend to know 
the facts of and the parties to the dispute better than would the enterprise-wide 
bodies. 141 
V. THE FORMAL RESOLUTION MACHINERY 
When a worker has a litigious dispute with management, he may present it 
for resolution through the procedures established by law .142 Any non-litigious 
dispute must be dealt with in a less formalized manner.143 The labor legisla-
tion empowers three bodies to hear labor disputes: The Commission on Labor 
Disputes (KTS), the local factory union committee (Fabrichnii, Zavodskii Mestnii 
Komitet, FZMK) , and the civil (People's) courts.l44 After outlining the formal 
procedures for dispute resolution, this Comment will discuss informal routes 
of settlement. 
135. Brown, Labor Relations, supra note 87, at 200. 
136. Id. 
137. 1974 Statute on Labor Disputes, 1974 VED. VERKH. Sov. SSSR, no. 22, item 325. 
138. Int'l Labor Organization, 1975 Soc. & LAB. BUL. 11 (1975). 
139. Ruble, Comparison, supra note 130, at 254-55. 
140. Id. 
141. USBLS, LABOR LAW IN THE U.S.S.R., supra note 16, at 34. 
142. See distinction between litigious and non-litigious disputes, § n.B supra. 
143. See § VI infra. An aggrieved worker is required to try to settle his complaint directly with 
management. 1974 Statute on Labor Disputes, para. 12, 1974 VED. VERKH. Sov. SSSR, no. 22, 
item 325. 
144. 1974 Statute on Labor Disputes, para. 1, 1974 VED. VERKH. Sov. SSSR, no. 22, item 325. 
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A. The Labor Disputes Commission (KTS) 
If an aggrieved worker cannot resolve hi" dispute through informal chan-
nels,145 he will turn to the court of compulsory first instance146 for hearing 
labor disputes, the KTS. The KTS is established at all Soviet workplacesl47 
where a trade union committee or union organizer is elected. 148 In any work-
place too small to have even a union organizer, a worker can take his case 
directly to a People's Court.149 
1. Composition of the KTS 
The KTS is a sitting body composed of equal numbers of permanent repre-
sentatives from both union and management. 150 This composition assures that 
neither side has an unfair advantage over the other in deciding cases. In those 
shops with fewer than fifteen employees and, thus, no shop committee151 the 
union organizer and director of the enterprise comprise the KTS.152 In the re-
mainder of the workplaces, the members of the KTS are selected in the follow-
ing manner: trade union representatives are appointed by resolution of the 
union committee,t53 and management's representatives are appointed by 
order of the head or general manager of the enterprise. 154 
The usual number of members of the KTS ranges from four to six,155 except 
in those small shops where only the union organizer and director comprise the 
board. 156 The size of the KTS is mutually agreed upon by both sides. 157 The 
posts of chairman and secretary rotate between the two sides at each sitting158 
and at no time may representatives of the same side hold both of these posi-
tions. 159 This procedure is one mechanism within the dispute resolution legis-
145. !d. 
146. GLAZYRIN & NIKITINSKY, supra note 15, at 170. 
147. LIVSHITZ & NIKITINSKY, supra note 20, at 197. 
148. GLAZYRIN & NIKITINSKY, supra note 15, at 169. 
149. !d. at 176. 
150. 1974 Statute on Labar Disputes, para. 3, 1974 VED. VERKH. SOY. SSSR, no. 22, item 325; 
D. LANE, Politics and Society in the USSR 312 (1970) [hereinafter cited as LANE]. 
151. USBLS, LABOR LAW IN THE U.S.S.R., supra note 16, at 34 n.53. 
152. 1957 Statute on Labor Disputes, para. 7, 1957 VED. VERKH. SOV. SSSR, no. 4, item 58. 
153. 1974 Statute on Labor Disputes, para. 3, 1974 VEll. VERKH. Sov. SSSR, no. 22, item 325. 
154. !d. The union members are elected to serve for one-year terms, with the possibility ofre-
election. See McAULEY, supra note 19, at 140. The management representatives are appointed to 
act" permanently." This is to prevent the director from sending different individuals to each sit-
ting, and from appointing a new representative and then demanding a new hearing. [d. 
155. USBLS, LABOR LAW IN THE U.S.S.R., supra note 16, at 34 n.53. 
156. 1971: Statute on Labor Disputes, paras. 3, 6, 1974 VED. VERKH. SOY. SSSR, no. 22, item 
325. 
157. 1971: Statute an Labor Disputes, para. 3,1974 VED. VERKE. SOY. SSSR, no. 22, item 325. 
158. 1971: Statute on Labor Disputes, para. 7, 1974 VED. VERKH. SOV. SSSR, no. 22, item 325; 
BROWN, supra note 15, at 204. 
159. 1974 Statute on Labor Disputes, para. 7, 1974 VED. VERKE. SOY. SSSR, no. 22, item 325; 
LiVSHITZ & NIKITINSKY, supra note 20, at 197. In addition, the chairman and secretary for the 
next session are named by the two sides during the current sitting. These persons are responsible 
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lation which attempts to provide maximum protection to the worker by allow-
ing for a minimum advantage to either side at the KTS hearing. 
2. Jurisdiction of the KTS 
The KTS hears any case involving a dispute between labor and manage-
ment unless other procedures exist for handling the specific type of conflict in-
volved. 160 The disputes taken to the KTS usually concern specific features of 
production. 161 However, a number of types of disputes are specifically exclud-
ed from the competence of the KTS.162 
for preparing the convening of the next session. !d. The technical services required by the com' 
mission (e.g., clerical work, keeping of files, preparation of the minutes and publication of ex-
tracts from the minutes) are provided by the enterprise. A clerical worker, appointed by the 
management, handles these duties. 1974 Statute on Labor Disputes. para. 8, 1974 YEO. VERKH. 
SOY. SSSR, no. 22, item 325. 
160. Piatakov, supra note 23, at 570-71, see § VI infra. 
161. The disputes which fall within the jurisdiction of the KTS and which are specifically 
named in the Decree of January 31,1957 are: 
a.) the application of established output norms and rates, and also labor conditions en-
suring the fulfillment of output norms; 
b.) dismissal or transfer to other work; 
v.) payment for idle-standing or rejects; 
g.) payment for doing work of different qualifications; 
d.) payment of unfinished work on piece-rates; 
e.) payment for time of absence from work; 
jh.) payment for overtime; 
z.) the right to a bonus and its amount as envisaged by the established system of pay-
ment; 
i.) payment when norms are not fulfilled; 
k.) amount of payment for probation period; 
I.) monetary compensation for unused leave; 
m.) the issue of special ("protective") clothing and special food, and, in appropriate 
cases, the payment of monetary compensation in: lieu; 
n.) deductions from wages for material damage caused to the enterprise, establish-
ment or organization; 
0.) the payment of discharge grants. 
1957 Statute on Labor Disputes, para. 10, 1957 YEO. VERKH. SOY. SSSR, no. 4, item 58; CON· 
QUEST, INDUSTRIAL WORKERS, supra note 68, at 181-82. 
162. The following disputes fall outside the KTS's jurisdiction: 
a.) the dismissal, reinstatement and transfer of certain responsible workers and 
employees, and the imposition of disciplinary penalties on these persons. The list 
of responsible persons, appended to the Decree rif January 31, 1957, includes the 
heads of enterprises, chief engineers, etc., and also the heads of workshops, senior 
foremen and foremen, etc.; 
b.) the imposition of disciplinary penalties on persons who come within the scope of 
the statutes on discipline (i.e., on the railways, river and sea transport, etc.); 
v.) the establishment of salaries and wage-rates; 
g.) the alteration of the personnel establishment; 
d.) the computation of the worker's period oflabor service for the purpose of social in-
surance or other rights and privileges; 
e.) the provision and allocation of housing, and also the satisfaction of the everyday 
needs of the workers. 
1957 Statute on Labor Disputes, para. 11, 1957 YEO. VERKH. SOY. SSSR, no. 4, item 58; CON· 
QUEST, INDUSTRIAL WORKERS, supra note 68, at 180. 
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The KTS is competent to hear cases brought by any worker in the factory, 
with the exception of workers in specified industries who are subject to a 
higher discipline,163 whether the worker is a member of the union or not. 164 
Those officials who are themselves part of management165 cannot submit their 
disputes to the KTS, but must appeal to their superior administrative agencies 
for settlement. 166 
3. Rules of Procedure 
A worker who has a grievance need not worry that his claim will lapse with 
time, as there is no time limit for application to the KTS for resolution of a 
claim. 167 However, once a complaint has been filed with the KTS,168 that body 
has five days within which to hold a hearing on the dispute. 169 During these 
five days the KTS must carry out all necessary preparatory work. 170 
The KTS must arrange to hear the dispute outside of working hours. 171 If 
the enterprise is so large as to have a shift rotation system, the hearing is held 
at a time when the worker involved and any witnesses are free. 172 This proce-
dure also allows all other interested workers to attend and to hear the case. All 
hearings must be held in the presence of the concerned worker, 173 unless he 
agrees in writing to allow a hearing in absentia. l74 In the case of repeated 
163. Mining, transport (both rail and water), communication, and occupations in higher 
education, the artistic world, the civil service and the Procuracy. See USBLS, LABOR LAW IN THE 
U.S.S.R., supra note 16, at 19, 34; McAULEY, supra note 19, at 132 n.2. 
164. V. KOROTKOV & M. YU. GOLDSHTEIN, CHTO NUZHNO ZNAT' RABOCHIM I 
SLUZHASHCHIM 0 TRUOOVYM ZAKONODATEL'STVE [WHAT WORKERS AND EMPLOYEES SHOULD 
KNOW ABOUT THE LABOR LEGISLATION] 333 (1963) [hereinafter cited as KOROTKOV & GOLDSH· 
TEIN]. 
165. For example, these positions range from foreman up to the director of the enterprise. See 
USBLS, LABOR LAW IN THE U.S.S.R., supra note 16, at 33. 
166. Brown, Resolution of Conflicts, supra note 25, at 272 n.90. 
167. 1974 Statute on Labor Disputes, para. 13, 1974 VED. VERKH. Sov. SSSR, no. 22, item 325. 
168. The trade union committee, or where that organization does not exist, the union 
organizer, is responsible for accepting petitions to the KTS. 1974 Statute on Labor Disputes, para. 
12, 1974 VED. VERKH. SOY. SSSR, no. 22, item 325; GLAZYRIN & NIKITINSKY, supra note 15, at 
171. 
169. 1974 Statute on Labor Disputes, para. 14, 1974 VED. VERKH. SOY. SSSR, no. 22, item 325. 
"These rules are intended to ensure a swift and objective resolution of disputes and safely protect 
the rights of employees." GLAZYRIN & NIKITINSKY, supra note 15, at 171. 
170. ld. at 172. 
171. 1974 Statute on Labor D.isputes, para. 15, 1974 VED. VERKH. SOY. SSSR, no. 22, item 325; 
BROWN, supra note 15, at 204. 
172. 1974 Statute on Labor Disputes, para. 5, 1974 VED. VERKH. SOY. SSSR, no. 22, item 325; 
LIVSHlTZ & NIKITINSKY, supra note 20, at 199. 
173. 1974 Statute on Labor Disputes, para. 16, 1974 VED. VERKH. SOY. SSSR, no. 22, item 325. 
"This gives him the opportunity personally to put his point of view and present his evidence." 
GLAZYRIN & NIKITINSKY, supra note 15, at 172. 
174. 1974 Statute on Labor Disputes, para. 16, 1974 VED. VERKH. SOY. SSSR, no. 22, item 325. 
LIVSHlTZ & NIKITINSKY, supra note 20, at 199. The importance of hearing the evidence against 
oneself and of confrontation of witnesses is recognized also in the American judicial system. See, 
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absence by the worker, the KTS can decide to disallow the claim, 175 but the 
worker may bring the same complaint again. 176 The KTS has the power to sum-
mon witnesses, 177 to charge individuals with carrying out technical checks and 
inspecting the books, 178 and to call for records and accounts to be submitted by 
the management. 179 As these procedures reflect, the KTS can hold a full 
investigative hearing before reaching its decision. The exercise of this power is 
another measure by which a proper result, upholding the rights of workers, 
can be achieved. 
KTS hearings are open to any interested worker. 180 The aggrieved worker 
can challenge any member of the board for cause. 181 If there is a challenge to a 
board member, the hearing is adjourned until the challenge is settled.182 If a 
management representative is challenged, management decides whether in 
fact the member is prejudiced. 183 If it is a union member who is challenged, 
the union decides the question. 184 Although every member of the KTS need 
not be present at every hearing,185 if only a part of the full body hears a case, 
the number of representatives of each side allowed to participate at the 
meeting is likewise limited. There must be equal representation between 
union and management at these hearings. 186 This requirement insures an 
even-handed decision. The worker has the right to amend and to supplement 
his demands at any time, even as the hearing progresses. 187 The worker also 
has the right to question witnesses and to demand that he be allowed to 
e.g., U.S. CaNST. amend. VI, and general notions of procedural due process, U.S. CaNsT. 
amend. V. 
175. 1974 Statute on Labor Disputes, para. 16, 1974 VED. VERKH. Sov. SSSR, no. 22, item 325; 
LIVSHITZ & NIKITINSKY, supra note 20, at 199. 
176. !d. 
177. 1974 Statute on Labor Disputes, para. 17, 1974 VED. VERKH. SOY. SSSR, no. 22, item 325; 
ILO, Industrial Relations, supra note 119, at 347. 
178. 1974 Statute on Labor Disputes, para. 17, 1974 VED. VERKH. Sov. SSSR, no. 22, item 325; 
LIVSHITZ & NIKITINSKY, supra note 20, at 199. 
179. 1974 Statute on Labor Disputes, para. 17, 1974 VED. VERKH. Sov. SSSR, no. 22, item 325; 
USBLS, LABOR LAW IN THE U.S.S.R., supra note 16, at 35. 
180. !d. 
181. 1974 Statute on Labor Disputes, para. 18, 1974 VED. VERKH. Sov. SSSR, no. 22, item 325. 
Arbiters in any dispute have to be absolutely impartial. Therefore, if the employee has 
any doubts about the objectivity of any member of the committee, he has the right to object 
to the person's presence at the start of the meeting. Grounds for objection might be that the ap-
plicant is on bad terms with a member of the labour dispute committee. 
GLAZYRIN & NIKITINSKY, supra note 15, at 172 (emphasis in original). 
182. 1974 Statute on Labor Disputes, para. 18, 1974 VED. VERKH. Sov. SSSR, no. 22, item 325; 
LIVSHITZ & NIKITINSKY, supra note 20, at 199. 
183. 1974 Statute on Labor Disputes, para. 18(a), 1974 VED. VERKH. Sov. SSSR, no. 22, item 
325; LIVSHITZ & NIKITINSKY, supra note 20, at 199; BROWN, supra note 15, at 204. 
184. 1974 Statute on Labor Disputes, para. 18(b), 1974 VED. VERKH. Sov. SSSR, no. 22, item 
325; LIVSHITZ & NIKITINSKY, supra note 20, at 199-200; BROWN, supra note 15, at 204. 
185. GLAZYRIN & NIKITINSKY, supra note 15, at 169-70. 
186. !d. at 170. 
187. !d. at 173. 
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familiarize himself with any document. IBB Procedural requirements for hear-
ing cases before the KTS are replete with safeguards designed to uphold the 
rights 9f the worker, while at the same time reaching the proper result. 
- 4. Decisions 
Any decision of the KTS must be reached by agreement among all members 
who heard the case. IB9 These decisions are binding on the parties when an-
nouncedl90 and do not need to be confirmed. 191 However, the KTS must have 
a legal basis for its decision,192 and it must announce the reasoning behind its 
decision. 193 The KTS is obliged to keep minutes of each sitting. 194 If no agree-
ment is reached, the proposals of each side must be included in the minutes 
and a note made that agreement was, in fact, not reached. 195 An extract of the 
minutes is delivered by post196 to the worker within three days of the hearing197 
and the minutes themselves are posted in a conspicuous spot in the workplace 
for the information of the rest of the workforce. 19B By having the minutes thus 
available, workers can learn of specific disputes and their resolutions. The case 
of an individual, in this way, can have meaning for the entire workplace. 
If a decision has been reached, management is obliged to fulfill the require-
ments of that decision within ten days,199 unless a shorter time is specified in 
188. Id. 
189. 1974 Statute on Labor Disputes, para. 19, 1974 VED. VERKH. Sov. SSSR, no. 22, item 325; 
Piatakov, supra note 23, at 570. 
190. LIVSHITZ & NIKITINSKY, supra note 20, at 200. 
191. ILO, Industrial Relations, supra note 119, at 347. 
192. 1974 Statute on Labor Disputes, para. 19, 1974 VED. VERKH. SOY. SSSR, no. 22, item 325. 
The decision must be based on either the current labor legislation, the collective agreement, the 
contract of employment, the rules of the enterprise, or the relevant regulations or instructions. 
LIVSHITZ & NIKITINSKY, supra note 20, at 200; Piatakov, supra note 23, at 571. But see Matey, 
Essential Traits of Socialist Labour Codes, 2 CaMP. LAB. L. 191 (1977), in which the author argues 
that: "The social bodies - arbitration commissions - apart from indispensable knowledge of 
outlmes of labour law, base their decisions on social and moral norms, on principles of social 
cooperation and human relations at work, or knowledge of the working environment and factual 
data. " 
/d. at 203. 
193. 1974 Statute on Labor Disputes, para. 19, 1974 VED. VERKH. SOY. SSSR, no. 22, item 325; 
Piatakov, supra note 23, at 571. 
194. 1974 Statute on Labor Disputes, para. 20, 1974 VED. VERKH. SOY. SSSR, no. 22, item 325; 
LIVSHITZ & NIKITINSKY, supra note 20, at 200. 
195. 1974 Statute on Labor Disputes, para. 20, 1974 VED. VERKH. SOY. SSSR, no. 22, item 325; 
LIVSHITZ & NIKITINSKY, supra note 20, at 200; ILO, Industrial Relations, supra note 119, at 347. 
196. 1974 Statute on Labor Disputes, para. 20, 1974 VED. VERKH. SOY. SSSR, no. 22, item 325; 
ILO, Industrial Relations, supra note 119, at 347. 
197. 1974 Statute on Labor Disputes, para. 20, 1974 VED. VERKH. SOY. SSSR, no. 22, item 325; 
LIVSHITZ & NIKITINSKY, supra note 20, at 200. 
198. 1974 Statute on Labor Disputes, para. 20, 1974 VED. VERKH. SOY. SSSR, no. 22, item 325; 
Piatakov, supra note 23, at 573. 
199. 1974 Statute on Labor Disputes, para. 32, 1974 VED. VERKH. SOY. SSSR, no. 22, item 325; 
Piatakov, supra note 23, at 571. 
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the decision itself.200 Should management fail to comply with the decision, the 
worker can approach his factory union committee for a document having the 
effect of a writ201 which obliges the director to comply. Should this document 
be insufficient to compel management's compliance, the worker may turn to 
the bailiff of the People's Court for a writ ordering compliance. 202 The worker 
has a full month in which to obtain the document from the union committee203 
and three more months in which to proceed to the court bailiff. 204 
5. Appeals from a Decision of the KTS 
If no agreement has been reached by the KTS, the worker has the right to 
appeal to the factory union committee. 205 In addition, should the KTS decide 
against the worker, he has an automatic right to appeal the judgment to the 
union committee. 206 Management has no such right to appeal a judgment 
rendered against it207 because management's own representatives agreed to 
the decision. 208 This greater access to appeals for the worker is another vehicle 
by which the rights of workers are protected. However, although the avenues 
of appeal are open to dissatisfied workers, only a small percentage of cases ac-
tually proceed to the union committee from the KTS.209 
200. 1974 Statute on Lahor Disputes, para. 32, 1974 YEO. VERKH. SOY. SSSR, no. 22, item 325; 
Zaichikov, supra note 88, at 83. 
201. 1974 Statute on Lahor Disputes, para. 33, 1974 YEO. VERKH. SOY. SSSR, no. 22, item 325; 
BROWN, supra note 15, at 206. 
202. LIVSHITZ & NIKITINSKY, supra note 20, at 203. 
203. 1974 Statute on Lahor Disputes, para. 5, 1974 YEO. VERKH. SOY. SSSR, no. 22, item 325; 
KOROTKOV & GOLOSHTEIN, supra note 164, at 344; ILO, Industrial Relations, supra note 119, at 
348. 
204. ILO, Industrial Relations, supra note 119, at 348. 
205. 1974 Statute on Lahor Disputes, para. 21, 1974 YEO. VERKH. SOY. SSSR, no. 22, item 325. 
The worker has ten days in which to appeal. Id. 
206. 1974 Statute on Lahor Disputes, para. 22, 1974 YEO. VERKH. SOY. SSSR, no. 22, item 325. 
See also "In the case of disputes over disciplinary penalties, workers may protest on the ground of 
the facts, or the severity of the penalty, or incorrect procedures." BROWN, supra note 15, at 209. 
207. LIVSHlTZ & NIKITINSKY, supra note 20, at 200. But see Ruble, Comparison, supra note 130, 
at 255. 
208. BROWN, supra note 15, at 205. 
209. According to one study, no more than ten to twenty percent of all decisions of the KTS 
are appealed to the FZMK. See MCAuLEY, supra note 19, at 152. Several reasons explain this fact. 
The most straightforward explanation is that workers win at the KTS and need not go to the 
FZMK for protection of their rights. According to McAuley, results favorable to the worker were 
achieved in anywhere from 44 percent of the decisions in one city for a given period, up to 70 per-
cent of the decisions in another city and at a different time. /d. at 156. Of those decisions which 
are appealable to the FZMK (i.e., where there has been no agreement or where the decision was 
against the worker), the probable reasons for the low number of KTS decisions appealed to the 
FZMK are twofold: 1) the worker has brought a spurious claim or one on which he was unsure of 
winning and hence when he is denied relief, he willingly drops the matter, and 2) the worker, be-
ing denied by the union representatives on the KTS, is persuaded of the probability of being turn-
ed down by the full FZMK. /d. at 157. 
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B. The Local Factory Union Committee (FZMK) 
The second agency established by legislation to hear labor disputes is the 
local union committee, the FZMK. A worker who disagrees with the decision 
of the KTS can resort to the FZMK. 
1. Composition 
The size and composition of the FZMK varies from enterprise to enterprise, 
but the number of representatives generally ranges from seven to 
twenty-one. 210 Both manual and non-manual workers, as well as technical and 
engineering staff, are represented on the FZMK.2l1 Through the union com-
mittee, the Soviets, therefore, have made an attempt to get a representative 
cross-section of the workforce involved in the dispute resolution process. 
2. Jurisdiction 
The FZMK is empowered to hear any case in which the KTS could not reach 
agreement or with which a worker disagrees. 212 Its jurisdiction is appellate on-
ly, and the FZMK is forbidden to hear a case presented by a worker that has 
not been presented first to the KTS.213 The FZMK need not even wait for a 
worker to appeal214 but has the power to reverse an illegal decision of the KTS 
in response to a protest made by the Procurator215 or on its own initiative. 216 
3. Rules of Procedure 
A worker who is dissatisfied with a decision rendered by the KTS has ten 
days, from the date he receives official confirmation from the minutes of that 
commission's meeting, to present his appeal to the union committee. 217 The 
210. Khitrov, supra note 85, at 521. 
211. /d. 
212. 1974 Statute on Labor Disputes, para. 23, 1974 VED. VERKH. SOV. SSSR, no. 22, item 325; 
Statute on the Rights oj Factory, Plant and Local Trade Union Committees, art. 19, 1971 VED. VERKH. 
Sov. SSSR, no. 31, item 382 (Sept. 29, 1971) [hereinafter cited as Factory Statute], translated in 23 
CDSP no. 39, Oct. 26, 1971, at 15-18. 
213. KOROTKOV & GOLDSHTEIN, supra note 164, at 340-41.· 
214. Factory Statute, art. 19, 1971 VED. VERKH. Sov. SSSR, no. 31, item 382. 
215. 1974 Statute on Labor Disputes, para. 25, 1974 VED. VERKH. Sov. SSSR, no. 22, item 325; 
Fundamental Principles oj Labor, art. 88, 1970 VED. VERKH. Sov. SSSR, no. 29, item 265; Factory 
Statute, art. 19, 1971 VED. VERKH. Sov. SSSR, no. 31, item 382. 
216. 1974 Statute on Labor Disputes, para. 25, 1974 VED. VERKH. Sov. SSSR, no. 22, item 325; 
Fundamental Principles oj Labor, art. 88, 1970 VED. VERKH. Sov. SSSR, no. 29, item 265; Factory 
Statute, art. 19, 1971 VED. VERKH. Sov. SSSR, no. 31, item 382 .. This means that the FZMK 
may ex officio review all decisions for legality. See Kiralfy, supra note 91, at 172. 
217. 1974 Statute on Labor Disputes, para. 21, 1974 VED. VERKH. Sov. SSSR, no. 22, item 325. 
However, failure by an employee to meet this requirement does not mandate refusal by the 
FZMK to hear the case. The FZMK must investigate the reasons for the failure and, if they are 
valid, the case is to be heard. See LIVSHITZ & N IKITINSKY, supra note 20, at 200. 
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FZMK must then handle the case within seven days.218 The union committee 
has a longer period during which to hear a case than does the KTS because the 
FZMK generally meets every ten days on a regular basis. 219 Appeals must be 
heard by a quorum of two-thirds of the entire FZMK. 220 The expanded time 
period, therefore, makes it more probable that such a quorum could be 
assembled to hear the case. 
The rules for a hearing before the union committee are virtually identical to 
those for a meeting of the KTS.221 Hearings in absentia are valid only with the 
written consent of the concerned worker. 222 Management is invited to be pres-
ent and to give its opinion. The committee may hear any evidence that it 
deems relevant. 223 
4. Decisions 
After consultation, the union committee decision is taken through passage 
of a resolution, by majority vote. 224 This resolution either upholds the decision 
of the KTS or renders a new decision in the matter. 225 A decision of the union 
committee, as that of the KTS, must have a basis in law or in the labor con-
tract.226 A resolution must be communicated to management and to the con-
cerned worker within three days after the hearing. 227 Although the FZMK is 
empowered only to satisfy, or to reject, the worker's specifi<;: demands, 228 there 
are reported cases where, at the insistence of the union committee, a par-
ticularly poor director has been replaced. 229 If the case involves pecuniary 
claims, e.g., back pay claims, the precise sum of money due the worker must 
be set out in the resolution. 230 
218. 1974 Statute on Labor Disputes, para. 26, 1974 VED. VERKH. SOY. SSSR, no. 22, item 325; 
LIVSHITZ & NIKITINSKY, supra note 20, at 201; GLAZYRIN & NIKITINSKY, supra note 15, at 174. 
219. McAULEY, supra note 19, at 146 n.2. 
220. ]d. BROWN, supra note 15, at 205. 
221.. McAULEY, supra note 19, at 146. 
222. 1974 Statute on Labor Disputes, para. 27, 1974 VED. VERKH. SOY. SSSR, no. 22, item 325; 
LIVSHITZ & NIKITlNSKY, supra note 20, at 201. 
223. McAULEY, supra note 19, at 146. 
224. USBLS, LABOR LAW IN THE U.S.S.R., supra note 16, at 35; LIVSHITZ & NIKITINSKY, 
supra note 20, at 201. 
225. 1974 Statute on Labor Disputes, para. 25, 1974 VED. VERKH. SOY. SSSR, no. 22, item 325; 
LIVSHITZ & NIKITINSKY, supra note 20, at 201. 
226. 1974 Statute on Labor Disputes, para. 28, 1974 VED. VERKH. SOY. SSSR, no. 22, item 325; 
LIVSHITZ & NIKITINSKY, supra note 20, at 201. 
227. 1974 Statute on Labor Disputes, para. 29, 1974 VED. VERKH. SOY. SSSR, no. 22, item 325. 
LIVSHITZ & NIKITINSKY, supra note 20, at 202. 
228. 1974 Statute on Labor Disputes, para. 25, 1974 VED. VERKH. SOY. SSSR, no. 22, item 325; 
GLAZYRIN & NIKITINSKY, supra note 15, at 174. 
229. Brown, Labor Relations, supra note 87, at 199. 
230. 1974 Statute on Labor Disputes, para. 28, 1974 VED. VERKH. SOY. SSSR, no. 22, item 325. 
If the FZMK orders reinstatement of a worker who has been dismissed or transferred to another 
post and management refuses to comply, the FZMK may decide that the worker should receive 
the remuneration due him for the entire period of his displacement. ILO, Industrial Relations, supra 
note 119, at 348. 
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As with the decisions of the KTS, resolutions of the FZMK must be followed 
or apRealed within ten days, unless a shorter period is specified. 231 Of course, 
management is required to comply. 232 If a worker is confronted with an un-
cooperative director, he can ask the union committee to issue a document 
compe.lling compliance by the director. 233 As a last resort, the worker can go to 
court and have the bailiff issue a writ against the disobedient director. 234 
S. Appeals 
The decision of the FZMK is not final. Both parties have the right to appeal 
the union committee's resolution to the People's Court. 235 The grounds for an 
appeal by management are more narrow than those allowed for an appeal by 
workers. This greater access to appeals in the system is another safeguard to 
protect workers. Management can complain only in the event of a misapplica-
tion of law to the case;236 laborers can appeal on the grounds that they do not 
agree with the decision. 237 Either party has ten days in which to press its ap-
peal. 238 
The worker is not limited to an appeal to the courts. He may appeal to a 
higher union body. 239 If this body agrees with the worker, it can bring 
pressure on management by requesting ministerial action. 240 If the govern-
231. 1974 Statute on Labor Disputes, para. 32, 1974 VED. VERKH. SOY. SSSR, no. 22, item 325; 
LIVSHITZ & NIKITINSKY, supra note 20, at 202. 
232. GLAZYRIN & NIKITINSKY, supra note 15, at 174. 
233. 1974 Statute on Labor Disputes, para. 33, 1974 VED. VERKH. SOY. SSSR, no. 22, item 325; 
LIVSHITZ & NIKITINSKY, supra note 20, at 202. This action assumes that no appeal has been taken 
by either. 
234. ILO, Industrial Relations, supra note 119, at 348. This drastic measure need not be taken. 
One union committee was faced with a manager who disobeyed both the KTS and the FZMK in 
their decisions that a worker should be paid a certain sum of money. Rather than turn to a court 
or to any other higher authorities, the union simply went to the state bank that held the accounts 
of the enterprise and had the worker paid directly from the funds of the enterprise. See BROWN, 
supra note 15, at 209. 
235. 1974 Statute on Labor Disputes, paras. 30-31, 1974 VED. VERKH. SOY. SSSR, no. 22, item 
325; Ruble, Comparison, supra note 130, at 255. 
236. 1974 Statute on Labor Disputes, para. 31, 1974 VED. VERKH. SOY. SSSR, no. 22, item 325; 
E. JOHNSON, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SOVIET LEGAL SYSTEM 200 (1969) [hereinafter cited as 
JOHNSON]; LIVSHITZ & NIKITINSKY, supra note 20, at 202. 
237. 1974 Statute on Labor Disputes, para. 30, 1974 VED. VERKH. SOY. SSSR, no. 22, item 325; 
Fundamental Principles oj Labor, art. 88, 1970 VED. VERKH. SOY. SSSR, no. 29, item 265. 
238. 1974 Statute on Labor Disputes, paras. 30-31, 1974 VED. VERKH. SOY. SSSR, no. 22, item 
325. According to one study, this right to appeal by management is more useful in theory than in 
practice, as the courts almost always will uphold a decision of the FZMK which supports the posi-
tion of the worker. See Ruble, Comparison, supra note 130, at 255. This proposition means that 
"the right of management to appeal a union committee's decision is deJacto, although not dejure, 
abrogated." Id. 
239. Ruble, Comparison, supra note 130, at 255. 
240. Id. Since the director of a plant is a state employee, see § II.C.2 supra, he is responsible to 
his superiors in the government bureaucracy. See BROWN, supra note 15, at 180. For reported 
cases where this intervention by the union authorities was responsible for resolving the dispute, 
see id. at 136-38. 
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mental bureaucracy is unresponsive, the union may turn to the Communist 
Party Committee. 241 The Party can influence the ministerial officials to force 
. the factory management to correct the situation. 242 Should this procedure fail, 
the worker may turn the case over to the legal staff of the union's regional 
council which is empowered to take the case to court. 243 If the union itself will 
not help the worker, he can apply to the Office of the Procurator for 
assistance. 244 
C. The People's Court 
1. Composition 
The third formal structure for resolving labor disputes is the People's 
Court. 245 Cases at the district level246 are heard by three persons: a profes-
sional judge247 and two non-professional "people's assessors. "248 The profes-
sional judges are elected by the general populace, for terms of five years, by 
241. Ruble, Comparison, supra note 130, at 255. 
242. !d. 
243. Id. 
244. Id. See discussion of the role of the Procurator, § Vl.D infra. 
245. 1974 Statute on Labor Disputes, para. lev), 1974 VED. VERKH. SOY. SSSR, no. 22, item 
325. 
246. The district (city) court is the lowest tier in the general court system. See 10 SOY. STAT. & 
DEC. 101 (Winter 1973-1974). 
247. The judge is professional only in the sense that his job is full-time rather than a two-week 
per year sitting in the court, as with the people's assessors. R. CONQUEST, JUSTICE AND THE 
LEGAL SYSTEM IN THE U.S.S.R. 29 (1968) [hereinafter cited as CONQUEST, LEGAL SYSTEM]. The 
only requirements for eligibility imposed by the legislation for election as ajudge are that the can-
didate possess the right of suffrage and that he be twenty-five years of age. Fundamental Principles of 
Legislation on Court Organization of the USSR and of the Union and Autonomous Republics [hereinafter 
cited as Fundamental Court Organization], art. 29,1971 VED. VERKH. SOY. SSSR, no. 33, item 332, 
translated in 10 SOY. STAT. & DEC. 102 (Winter 1973-1974). There is no requirement of legal 
training. However, previous experience as a people's judge is valued highly. In 1965, 76 percent 
of those elected as such judges in the U.S.S.R. had prior experience as ajudge. See BYULLETEN 
VERKHOVNOGO SUDA SSSR, no. 1, 1966, at 5, cited in CONQUEST, LEGAl. SYSTEM, supra at 27. 
However, the overall level of training is not impressive. In 1965, only 80.9 percent of the people's 
judges elected had received a higher legal education. !d. 
248. People's assessors are referred to as "jurymen" by certain Soviet analysts. See LIVSHITZ 
& NIKITINSKY, supra note 20, at 203. But see criticism of this reference to assessors as jurymen, 
because such a label implies a comparison between the role of the assessor with that of the jury 
member of bourgeois justice systems, in 32 CDSP no. 35, Oct. 1, 1980, at 19, col. 1. 
Conquest gives a very good description of the assessor: 
The people's assessors date back as an institution to 1917. Their resemblance to a 
jury begins and ends with the fact that they are not part of the judicial establishment; 
that they serve only for a period of two weeks in the year over a period of five years; and 
that they are not paid a salary. They are more akin to non-professional co-judges. 
At present, panels of people's assessors are attached to all courts, up to and including 
the USSR Supreme Court. ... People's assessors elected to People's Courts perform 
their service within a two-year period; those elected to higher courts, within a five-year 
period. Despite the people's assessors' formal responsibility for assisting in arriving at a 
verdict, they normally have little or no legal training. 
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secret ballot. 249 The people's assessors are chosen for terms of two-and-a-half 
years at general meetings held at both workplaces and residences of the people 
within a given district. 250 The assessors have the same authority at court hear-
ings as the judges, 251 but they normally leave the active conduct of the hearing 
in the hands of the judge. 252 Assessors are called upon to serve no more than 
two weeks per year unless a matter they are handling extends beyond that 
time. 253 
2. Jurisdiction 
The People's Courts have both original and appellate jurisdiction in matters 
concerning labor disputes. Original jurisdiction is narrow and includes those 
cases brought by a worker whose workplace is too small to have its own union 
committee,254 requests for reinstatement by workers who have been dismissed 
by management without approval by the trade union,255 and those disputes 
concerning management decisions taken with the trade union committee's 
consent. 256 Workers who occupy job positions named in a special list, 257 such 
as higher management officials, may not appeal to the People's Court but 
must submit their disputes to higher administrative bodies. 258 
The people's assessors normally attend court for not more than two weeks in the 
year, during which period they retain their wages at their normal place of work, or if 
they are not workers or employees, other financial arrangements are made (hitherto ex-
isting regulations provided for the payment in such cases of a daily-allowance of 10 
roubles). In the event of the temporary absence of a People's Court judge (by reason of 
sickness or leave) his duties are assigned by the district Soviet to one of the people's 
assessors. The procedure for the recall of people's assessors is the same as that for 
judges; 
CONQUEST, LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 247, at 29-30 (citations omitted). 
249. CONSTITUTION (FUNDAMENTAL LAW) OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS 
(1977) [U.S.S.R. CONST. (1977)] art. 152. This is the third constitution for the U.S.S.R. See a 
brief history of the two earlier constitutions of the U.S.S.R., and a history of the constitutions of 
the Soviet Union's predecessor, the R.S.R.S.R. in L. GRIGORYAN & Y. DOLGOPOLOV, FUN-
DAMENTALS OF SOVIET STATE LAW 27-49 (1971). Although the judges are theoretically elected by 
the people, one analyst suggests that they are in fact hand-picked by the Communist Party. See 
USBLS, LABOR LAW IN THE U.S.S.R., supra note 16, at 19. 
250. U.S.S.R. CONST. (1977) art. 152. The voting is by a show of hands. /d. 
251. U.S.S.R. CONST. (1977) art. 154. Fundamental Court Organization, art. 30, 1971 VED. 
VERKH. Sov. SSSR, no. 33, item 332. 
252. USBLS, LABOR LAW IN THE U.S.S.R., supra note 16, at 19. But see criticism of this 
analysis, in 32 CDSP no. 35, Oct. 1, 1980, at 19, col. 1. 
253. Fundamental Court Organization, art. 31, 1971 VED. VERKH. SOV. SSSR, no. 33, item 332. 
254. GLAZYRIN & NIKITINSKY, supra note 15, at 176. 
255. HAZARD, supra note 70, at 222. As a Soviet student of labor law notes: 
First, experience and sociological studies show that the more a labour dispute affects a 
person's vital interests, the- more likely he is to appeal for help to the courts. This 
circumstance is taken into account in the legislation: disputes affecting the paramount 
labour rights of employees are examined directly in the courts. 
GLAZYRIN & NIKITINSKY, supra note 15, at 175. 
256. International Labor Organization, Statute on the Procedure for the Consideration of Labor 
Disputes, 1975 Soc. & LAB. BUL. 11, 12 (1975). The worker would receive no benefit in turning 
for assistance to the union in this last situation because the union has acted already. 
257. 1974 Statute on Labor Disputes, para. 41, 1974 VED. VERKH. SOV. SSSR, no. 22, item 325. 
258. /d. See also text accompanying notes 165-66, supra. 
1981 J SOVIET LABOR DISPUTE RESOLUTIONS 389 
The appellate jurisdiction of the People's Court is much broader than its 
original jurisdiction. Appellate jurisdiction includes all cases brought to the 
court by workers who are dissatisfied with the decision of the factory union 
committee. 259 The error cited by the worker can be one of fact or of law. 260 On 
the other hand, management can make an appeal to the People's Court, but 
only based on an alleged error oflaw by the FZMK.261 Finally, should the Office 
of the Procurator determine that a genuine right has been violated and that 
neither party has taken the case to court, this office can initiate an appeal in 
the People's Court. 262 
3. Rules of Procedure 
A worker who has been dismissed illegally may apply to the People's Court 
for a hearing within thirty days of his dismissal. 263 Otherwise, he loses his right 
to go to court. 264 If he is appealing from an adverse judgment of the FZMK, 
the worker has ten days from receipt of the union committee's decision in 
which to appeal. 265 The court does have discretion to decide whether it will ac-
cept claims that are late, if a satisfactory reason is given. 266 All cases taken to 
the People's Court are submitted to the district court in which the enterprise is 
located. 267 The court then has ten days268 from the time it accepts a case to 
prepare for it, conduct hearings and pass judgment. 269 
259. LIVSHlTZ & NIKITINSKY, supra note 20, at 203. 
260. [d. 
261. [d. 
262. [d. Ruble, Comparison, supra note 130, at 255. 
263. P. P. GUREYEV & P. 1. SEDUGIN, LEGISLATION IN THE USSR 226 (1977) [hereinafter 
cited as GUREYEV & SEDUGINJ. 
264. GLAZYRIN & NIKITINSKY, supra note 15, at 176. 
265. McAULEY, supra note 19, at 209. 
266. !d. KOROTKOV & GOLDSHTEIN, supra note 164, at 351. 
267. OLAZYRIN & NIKITINSKY, supra note 15, at 176. 
268. This is the usual time limit. !d. However, it is up to the U nion-Republic to set its own 
limits. A Union-Republic in the Soviet Union is analogous to a state in the United States in that 
it is a sovereignty separate from the federal whole. For the rights and duties of the Soviet Union-
Republics, see U.S.S.R. CONST. (1977) arts. 70-81. 
There are fifteen Union-Republics comprising the U.S.S.R. They are: the Russian Soviet 
Federated Socialist Republic (R.S.F.S.R.); the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic; the 
Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic; the U zbek Soviet Socialist Republic; the Kazakh Soviet 
Socialist Republic; the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic; the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist 
Republic; the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic; the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic; the 
Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic; the Kirgiz Soviet Socialist Republic; the Tajik Soviet Socialist 
Republic; the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic; the Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic; and 
the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic. U.S.S.R. CONST. (1977) art. 71. 
Those republics which have adopted the Code oj Labor Laws oj the RSFSR, as have both the 
R.S.F.S.R. and the Uzbek S.S.R., allow a five-day time limit for the court to hear a labor case. 
See KOROTKOV & GOLDSHTEII'-i, supra note 164, at 351. Most republics which have not adopted 
this Code allow the longer seven-day to ten-day period. !d. For complaints of illegal dismissal, 
however, courts in all the Union-Republics must handle the cases within five days of receipt of 
the complaint. [d. 
269. GLAZYRIN & NIKITINSKY, supra note 15, at 176. If the worker leaves the district, by accept-
ing employment elsewhere for example, the court has twenty days to try the case. [d. 
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A worker may make his appeal to the court either orally or in writing. 270 He 
is relieved of all costs involved in going to court. 271 On the other hand, if man-
agement appeals from an adverse judgment of the union committee, manage-
ment is required to pay court costS.272 In situations in which management ap-
peals, the court often allows the trade union to send a representative to defend 
the rights of the worker. 273 These rules and procedures are designed to give a 
worker greater confidence in the court as the true defender of his rights. In 
theory, workers will then turn to the courts more readily and the interests of 
workers will be better served. 
4. Decisions 
After hearing a case, the People's Court makes a decision by majority 
vote. 274 The two non-professionals can prevail over the judge, as none of the 
three has a voting advantage over the others.275 A decision goes into effect ten 
days after its pronouncement unless a stay pending appeal is granted by the 
district court. 276 
In a case involving a vital interest of the workers, such as reinstatement 
after illegal dismissal, immediate compliance by the enterprise is required,277 
even where an appeal has been taken. In cases of particular hardship, the 
court can order the enterprise to pay the worker up to one month's wages im-
mediately.278 In most other cases where a worker has been reinstated, the 
court may rule that the worker be paid his average wage for the entire time of 
his enforced absence from work,279 up to a limit of three months' pay. 280 If the 
enterprise is required to reimburse back wages, the court can, in its discretion, 
270. Piatakov, supra note 23, at 572. 
271. !d. LIVSHITZ & NIKITINSKY, supra note 20, at 204. 
272. McAULEY, supra note 19, at 240. 
273. Brown, Resolution of Conflicts, supra note 25, at 273; Zaichikov, supra note 88, at 84. The 
union representatives have the right to acquaint themselves with the materials of the case, to raise 
objections and to present evidence. !d. Should the union decide not to support the worker in 
court, he is not left to fend for himself, as any legal aid required by a worker in court will be pro-
vided free of charge by the bar itself. LIVSHITZ & N IKITINSKY, supra note 20, at 204. How often 
this happens in practice is another question entirely and one about which there is little data. 
274. Id. at 203. 
275. Cases in which the people's assessors overrule the judge are only rarely reported, and 
even then, the situations suggest that they are exceptions. CONQUEST, LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 
247, at 28. However, when such cases are reported, the idea that these examples should be 
followed by other normally all-too-passive people's assessors is generally implied. !d. On the 
other hand, there are also reported cases in which a judge illegally overrules both assessors and 
records a judgment in the face of two dissenting opinions. !d. 
276. KOROTKOV & GOLDSHTEIN, supra note 164, at 352-53. 
277. Fundamental Principles of Labor, art. 92, 1970 VED. VERKH. Sov. SSSR, no. 29, item 265; 
McAULEY, supra note 19, at 209. 
278. Piatakov, supra note 23, at 572. 
279. Fundamental Principles of Labor, art. 92, 1970 VED. VERKH. Sov. SSSR, no. 29, item 265; 
GUREYEV & SEDUGIN, supra note 263, at 226. 
280. Fundamental Principles of Labor, art. 92, 1970 VED. VERKH. S9V. SSSR, no. 29, item 265; 
GLAZYRIN & NIKITINSKY, supra note 15, at 178. 
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impose personal liability on the manager who is guilty of the illegal 
dismissal.281 However, while the manager would have to reimburse his enter-
prise for any payments made to the employee due to the illegal dismissal,282 
there is a maximum on the amount he would have to pay. 283 
This penalty is not the only one which a People's Court can impose on a 
manager guilty of violating the rights of his workers. In addition, the court has 
the power to issue a "personal injunction" against the director, notifying 
superiors in higher administrative bodies of the director's illegal acts. 284 The 
manager could be removed for gross violations, thereby protecting other 
workers in the future. 285 For the most flagrant abuses of worker rights, a 
manager can be subjected to a criminal trial with a potential maximum penal-
ty of one year's corrective labor.286 
5. Appeals 
Decisions of the People's Court are appealable to a higher court. 287 If either 
party to the case, or the Procurator, feels that the district court made an error 
of law,288 that court's decision is appealable within ten days289 to the regional 
court. As with the earlier appeal, if the worker is making the appeal, he pays 
no costs. Management, on the other hand, pays all court costs when it 
appeals. 290 
281. Fundamental Principles of Labor, art. 93, 1970 VED. VERKH. Sov. SSSR, no. 29, item 265; 
GLAZYRIN & NIKITINSKY, supra note 15, at 178; GUREYEV & SEDUGIN, supra note 263, at 226-27. 
282. Fundamental Principles of Labor, art. 93, 1970 VED. VERKH. Sov. SSSR, no. 29, item 265; 
GLAZYRIN & NIKITINSKY, supra note 15, at 178; BROWN, supra note 15, at 218. According to one 
study, only nine percent of over 95,000 rubles in back pay was reimbursed by management of-
ficials. See id. at 217. 
283. The limit is not supposed to exceed the equivalent of three month's wages for the direc-
tor. Fundamental Principles of Labor, art. 93, 1970 VED. VERKH. Sov. SSSR, no. 29, item 265. 
284. McAULEY, supra note 19, at 209. 
285. Postanovleniye Plenuma Verkhovnogo Suda SSSR, no. 13, Sept. 13, 1957, BYULLETEN 
VERKHOVNOGO SUDA SSSR, 1957, no. 5, § 19, cited in McAULEY, supra note 19, at 209 n.3. 
286. !d. at 209. 
287. Article 151 of the Soviet Constitution provides: 
In the USSR there are the following courts: the Supreme Court of the USSR, the 
Supreme Courts of Union Republics, the Supreme Courts of Autonomous Republics, 
Territorial, Regional and city courts, courts of Autonomous Regions, courts of 
Autonomous Areas, district (city) people's courts, and military tribunals in the Armed 
Forces. 
U.S.S.R. CaNsT. (1977) art. 151. Within their respective city limits, the Moscow and Leningrad 
city courts have the status of regional courts. They are courts of second instance which exercise 
judicial supervision over People's courts in city districts. For People's courts located in the 
Moscow and Leningrad regions, the superior tribunals are the Moscow and Leningrad regional 
courts. See 10 SOV. STAT. & DEC. 101 (Winter 1973-1974). 
288. Piatakov, supra note 23, at 572. 
289. !d. Certain Union-Republics allow a longer time for appeals to be taken; the Turkmen 
S.S.R. grants a two-week period for appeals, the Georgian, Uzbek and Azerbaijan S.S.R.'s each 
permit fifteen days for appeal. KOROTKOV & GOLDSHTEIN, supra note 164, at 352; McAULEY, 
supra note 9, at 240 n.1. 
290. McAULEY, supra note 19, at 240. 
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The regional court has three options in handling a case brought to it on ap-
peal: (1) it can adopt the lower decision, (2) it can quash the lower court deci-
sion and return the case for rehearing in the district court, or (3) under a 
special provision, it can repeal the district court's decision and replace it with 
a new decision. 291 The appellate court can only render a new decision that is 
based on the evidence presented in the district court. If the regional court 
hears any new evidence that would require a new decision, it must remand the 
case to the district court without passing judgment. 292 However, should the 
appellate court rule that the district court based its decision on an inappropri-
ate section of the legislation, the appellate court may repeal the lower decision 
and issue its own decision. 293 The judicial hierarchy in the U.S.S.R. is similar 
to that in the American court system. Appeals from the regional court are 
taken to the Union-Republic supreme court and, finally to the Supreme Court 
of the U.S.S.R.m 
VI. INFORMAL RESOLUTION OF LABOR DISPUTES 
The three bodies empowered by Soviet labor legislation to hear disputes are 
not designed to decide all possible conflicts which arise throughout Soviet in-
dustry. A large category of disputes is specifically outside the competence of 
the KTS, FZMK and People's Court. These non-litigious disputes must be 
resolved in other, less formal ways. Informal methods to be used by the worker 
have been institutionalized in at least two forms: (1) the holding of a direct 
negotiation between worker and management and, (2) the writing of critical 
letters to the unions or to newspapers. 295 In addition, two other agencies, the 
Comrades' Court and the Office of the Procuracy, are competent to handle 
certain labor cases. 296 
A. Direct Negotiations 
When a worker believes that his rights have been violated in some manner 
by management, he will usually turn, in the first instance, to his foreman or 
other direct supervisor. 297 Where there is a simple mistake or misunderstand-
ing, discussion will usually settle the problem. The worker can present his 
complaint to the foreman informally and need not present his grievance in 
291. !d. at 240-41; Piatakov, supra note 23, at 572. 
292. McAULEY, supra note 19, at 241. 
293. !d. 
294. !d. at 242-43. 
295. See § VI.A, B infra. 
296. See § VI.C, D infra. 
297. USBLS, LABOR LAW IN THE U.S.S.R., supra note 16, at 34. This is a mandatory first 
step in the resolution process. See 1957 Statute on Labor Disputes, para. 12, 1957 VED. VERKH. Sov. 
SSSR, no. 4, item 58. 
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writing. 29s Once the superior is aware of the problem, he is expected to make a 
judgment as to the competing rights and to resolve the disagreement prompt-
ly.299 
If the worker cannot get satisfaction from his immediate supervisor, he pro-
ceeds to his trade union group organizer, 300 the lowest-ranked union func-
tionary in the shop. This organizer intervenes, on behalf of the worker, be-
tween the worker and the foreman. 301 The worker has the right to be present at 
any discussion between the foreman and the organizer. 302 If this second at-
tempt at settlement fails, the representative of the shop union committee 
meets, informally, with the shop manager. 303 It is uncertain whether the 
worker has a right to attend this meeting. 3o• Thus, this process is designed to' 
iron out any simple misunderstandings quickly and smoothly. 
Only after the worker has taken these preliminary measures is he allowed to 
present his case to the KTS.305 The KTS will hear only those cases involving a 
true dispute and will not hear those involving an oversight or misunderstand-
ing.306 Before approaching the KTS, however, a worker may attempt to have 
higher union bodies intervene for him with the manager. 307 According to 
several Soviet workers, though, the assistance of the union is often ineffective 
because the union leaders are overruled by members of the Communist 
Party.30S 
B. Writing Critical Letters 
Workers with complaints about the management of their enterprise are 
allowed, and even encouraged,309 to write directly to their unions. Over a 
four-year period, the highest union body in the U.S.S.R., the All-Union Cen-
tral Council of Trade Unions (AUCCTU),31O received roughly 400,000 such 
298. Zawodny, supra note 27, at 544. 
299. GLAZYRIN & NIKITINSKY, supra note 15, at 171. 
300. USBLS, LABOR LAW IN THE U.S.S.R., supra note 16, at 34. The post of group organizer 
is similar to the shop steward in American labor organizations. See Zawodny, supra note 27, at 
544. 
301. USBLS, LABOR LAW IN THE U.S.S.R., supra note 16, at 34. 
302. Zawodny, supra note 27, at 544. 
303. Id. BROWN, supra note 15, at 206. 
304. Zawodny, supra note 27, at 544. 
305. See 1957 Statute on Labor Disputes, para. 12, 1957 YED. YERKH. SOV. SSSR, no. 4, item 58; 
LIVSHITZ & NIKITINSKY, supra note 20, at 199. 
306. GLAZYRIN & NIKITINSKY, supra note 15, at 171. 
307. See text accompanying notes 239-44, supra. 
308. Labor's Woes in "Workers' Paradise," 87 U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Oct. 8, 1979, at 
71. 
309. Pravda, supra note 37, at 342-43. 
310. For a description of the role played by the Central Council of Trade Unions (CCTU), see 
BROWN, supra note 15, at 80-81: 
As leader of the mass organization of Soviet workers, the CCTU has a responsible posi-
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letters.31l Workers also write to newspapers that are published by the unions 
(Trud) and by the Party (Pravda). The volume of this mail is enormous.312 
While it is true that not every letter contains a complaint, roughly twenty to 
fifty percent of the letters received are critical of management. m 
There is a special institution of worker-correspondents in the Soviet press, 
and these correspondents perform a dual function. They both agitate at the 
local level and help the people express themselves to the Party and to the gov-
ernment.314 These Rabkon (Rabochiye Korrespontient,) are recruited primarily 
from the ranks of Party members, Komsomols (the Communist Youth League) 
and other activists at state enterprises. 315 The Rabkon represent a "network of 
non-professional correspondents." 316 Their work is coordinated and tied to 
the task of building communism through Party-sponsored, large scale assem-
blies oflay journalists. 317 
However, these semi-professional journalists are not the only workers who 
send in complaints. Common workers also write to the papers themselves; 
sometimes in groups, sometimes individually.318 On the whole, letters signed 
by individuals complain of single rather than of multiple wrongs; most often, 
they deal with such things as violations of workers' rights and retail deficien-
tion in Soviet society. Although led by directives of the Communist Party and headed 
by prominent party members, it also speaks for workers at high levels of the party and 
government when policies are being considered. It issues authoritative instructions to 
all union organizations. It joins government agencies in issuing decree.s and regula-
tions. 
Major functions of the CCTU . . . include the control, direction and leadership of 
all the unions, and, on the other hand, relations with government and public affairs. 
On intra-union matters the CCTU determines the structure and staffs of all union 
organizations and approves their budgets, checks on their work and gives them instruc-
tions. It establishes trade union schools and publishes books and periodicals at its own 
press. In the public sphere, the CCTU is entitled to participate in working out the na-
tional economic plan and to receive reports from all government and administrative 
agencies. It has the right to take part in the preparation and consideration of all govern-
mental decisions affecting labor, and has responsibilities in the administration and en-
forcement of labor law. 
!d. (citations omitted). 
311. !d. at 225. 
312. Trudreported that it received 313,556 letters in 1963 alone. This was almost 5,000 more 
than in 1962. !d. 
313. Pravda, supra note 37, at 343. 
314. For a general discussion of the role of the press in the Soviet Union, see B. Ramundo, 
They Answer (To) Pravda, 1964 U. ILL. L.F. 103 [hereinafter cited as Ramundo]. For a discussion 
of the work done by the worker-correspondents, see id. at 109-10. 
315. ld. at 109. 
316. Finn, Experience of a Soviet Journalist 17 (Research Program in the U.S.S.R., Mimeo. 
Series No. 66, 1954) at 9, cited in Ramundo, supra note 314, at 109 n.51. 
317. !d. at 109. See lz odnogo kresla v drugoye [From One Armchair to Another], Pravda, Oct. 12, 1963, 
at 2, cited in Ramundo, supra note 314, at 109 n.54. 
318. In one study, of the letters published, approximately forty-five percent were written by a 
single worker, forty percent were authored by a group of five or fewer workers and the remaining 
fifteen percent came from larger groups. See Pravda, supra note 37, at 347. 
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cies.319 Group letters tend to concentrate on working and living conditions, as 
well as the organization oflabor and of production. 320 The five most frequent-
ly cited problems concern factory conditions, organization of labor and pro-
duction, income and standards of living, management performance and trade 
union performance. 321 
C . 17ze Comrades' Court 
The Soviets' view the Comrades' Court322 as an educational body rather 
than as a punishment-dispensing body. 323 Hence, there is an emphasis on in-
formality and the use of social pressure324 on a recalcitrant worker by his peers 
to induce him to conform to societal norms. 
1. Composition 
The Comrades' Court is a body composed of members of the collectivem 
who sit in judgment of their peers. 326 Members of the Comrades' Court are 
elected for terms of two years at general meetings of the collective. 327 The size 
319. [d. 
320. !d. 
321. !d. at 344. 
322. There is no All-Union (i. e., federal) Soviet legislation governing the work of the Com-
rades' Court, so for the purposes of this Comment, the StatuJe on the Comrades' Court of the Russian 
Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [hereinafter cited as Statute on Comrades' Court], 1977 YEOOMOSTI 
YERKHOVNOGO SOVETA RSFSR [YEO. RSFSR], no. 12, item 254 (Mar. 24, 1977), will serve as 
the model statute. 
323. See, e.g., StatuJe on Comrades' Court, art. 1, 1977 YEO. RSFSR, no. 12, item 254, and 
statements such as the following: 
Comrades' courts do important work in socializing citizens.in the spirit of irrecon-
cilability to violations of Soviet laws and the norms of communist morality. They pro-
mote a strengthening of labor discipline, the protection of socialist property, and the 
struggle against hooliganism, drunkenness, and other antisocial behavior. Successes in 
their activity are explained principally by the fact that they rest on the force of public 
opinion, which can exercise a profound socializing influence. 
N. Bashkatov, The New·StaiuJe on Comrades' Courts, 17 Sov. L. & Gov'T 44, 44 (Summer 1978) 
[hereinafter cited as Bashkatov]. . 
This education can be rough on undisciplined workers, as Professor Brown attests: 
Managers and union officers described the extreme embarrassment of workers thus 
openly criticized by their fellows and how they would swear "Never again." One direc-
tor offered a worker in a disciplinary case the choice of going to the People's Court, the 
regular lowest court oflaw, or to the Comradely Court in the plant, and he chose to take 
his chance in the People's Court. 
Brown, Labor Relations, supra note 87, at 194. For criticism of the Comrades' Courts, seeJudges or 
Comrades?, supra note 1 7. 
324. Brown, Labor Relations, supra note 87, at 194. 
325. The collective means both at the workplace and at the apartment complex. See Statute on 
Comrades' Courts, art. 2, 1977 YEO. RSFSR, no. 12, item 254. 
326. Brown, Labor Relations, supra note 87, at 194. 
327. StaiuJe on Comrades' Courts, art. 5, 1977 YEO. RSFSR, no. 12, item 254. The election pro-
cedures, in detail, are as follows: candidates are proposed by the Communist Party, the Komsomol 
(Communist Youth League), trade-union and other social organizations, and by individual citi-
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of a given court will vary, as each electorate decides the size of its own court. 328 
2. Jurisdiction 
Comrades' Courts have jurisdiction over labor matters involving unexcused 
absence from work, 329 late arrival to or early departure from work330 and other 
breaches oflabor discipline. 331 These courts also hear cases involving failure to 
observe safety regulations. 332 They are prohibited from hearing cases of viola-
tions of the law or of civil disputes in which disciplinary or administrative 
penalties may be assessed. 333 Also, once a court decision on the matter has 
already been handed down, including that of another Comrades' Court hav-
ing valid jurisdiction, the Comrades' Court may not hear the case. 334 
Cases may be initiated in the Comrades' Court by anyone of various agen-
cies335 or by the court itself. 336 Management has the right to refer any instance 
of a breach of discipline to the Comrades' Court rather than to impose a 
penalty.337 Indeed, it is common for a director to turn a case over to the Com-
rades' Court at the factory for resolution rather than to dismiss a worker for 
unexcused absence from work. 338 In those cases where a Comrades' Court 
judges itself incompetent to hear the dispute, due either to the complexity of 
the case or because a criminal prosecution is indicated, it will render a decision 
to that effect and turn the case over to the appropriate agency for resolution. 339 
zens. Bashkatov, supra note 323, at 45. The lists of candidates are posted beforehand so that peo-
ple have a chance to familiarize themselves with the names. !d. The trade-union committees call a 
meeting to elect the courts at the enterprises and offices. !d. The date of the election is publicized 
well in advance. !d. Participants at the meeting can have the name of any candidate stricken from 
the ballot, provided a good reason is offered. !d. In addition, new candidates may be proposed. 
!d. If such a challenge is made, the meeting decides, by majority vote, whether to support or to 
reject the proposed removal of candidates. !d. Persons are elected to the court if they receive more 
votes than all other candidates combined and more than half the votes of those present at the 
meeting. !d. 
328. Statute on Comrades' Courts, art. 5, 1977 VED. RSFSR, no. 12, item 254. However, the 
court cannot consist of fewer than five members. [d. 
329. Statute on Comrades' Courts, art. 7(1), 1977 VED. RSFSR, no. 12, item 254. 
330. [d. 
331. [d. 
332. !d. art. 7(2). Most often, cases of absenteeism, faulty work and minor acts of damage to 
the factory are heard by the Comrades' Court. See Kiralfy, supra note 91, at 165. There are occa-
sional cases of drunkenness at home and of petty hooliganism connected with behavior outside 
the factory which a Comrades' Court will hear. See McAULEY, supra note 19, at 192. 
333. Statute on Comrades' Courts, art. 8, 1977 VED. RSFSR, no. 12, item 254. 
334. [d. 
335. The FZMK, art. 10(1), id.; state organs, art. 10(2), id.; cooperative agencies, art. 10(3), 
id.; and private citizens, art. 10(5), id. 
336. !d. art. 10(6). It is rare for the court to bring a case on its own initiative, however. See B. 
Ramundo, The Comrades' Courts of the Soviet Union, 25-26 (International Affairs Division, U.S. 
Army, Judge Advocate General) (undated, unpublished report in Harvard Law School Library) 
[hereinafter cited as Ramundo, Comrades' Courts1. 
337. Statute on Comrades' Courts, art. 7, 1977 VED. RSFSR, no. 12, item 254. 
338. Kahl, supra note 134, at 96. 
339. Statute on Comrades' Courts, art. 17,1977 VED. RSFSR, no. 12, item 254. 
1981] SOVIET LABOR DISPUTE RESOLUTIONS 397 
3. Rules of Procedure 
Comrades' Courts are empowered to hear all cases, other than those involv-
ing petty hooliganism or speculation, within fifteen days from the time that 
they are submitted to the court. 340 The hearings are held after working hours 
so that the entire collective may attend. 341 This regulation ensures maximum 
participation by the community in the hearing and resolution of cases. Each 
case must be heard by a minimum of three members of the court. 342 Any 
member of the court may be challenged for cause. 343 The accused has the right 
to attend. 344 A judgment delivered after a hearing held in the absence of the 
worker is invalid unless it is the second time the worker has failed to appear 
without a good reason. 345 Once again, this requirement is intended to ensure 
the feeling that justice has been done because an accused has had the oppor-
tunity to face the charges, witnesses and evidence against him. A Comrades' 
Court cannot hold a hearing on a matter unless it has ample evidence of the 
guilt of the offender. 346 Emphasis on ascertaining guilt is so great that Com-
rades' Court judges are exhorted to arrange for the offender to confess his mis-
deeds publicly at the trial and to ask forgiveness. 347 
340. /d. art. 11. Cases of petty hooliganism and speculation must be tried within ten days. [d. 
341. /d. art. 13. 
342. /d. 
343. [d. The court decides the challenge itself. /d. 
344. /d. art. 14. 
345. /d. 
346. BERMAN,JUSTICE IN THE U.S.S.R., supra note 1, at 280. 
347. /d. The atmosphere at a Comrades' Court trial may be described as informal to the point 
of the hearing being a kangaroo court. The following description of a Comrades' Court hearing 
sent in a letter to the editor of the national literary magazine, Literaturnaia Gazeta, is highly illumi-
nating: 
Not long ago I had occasion to be present at a meeting of the comrades' court of 
Housing Operation Office No. 16 of Moscow's Bauman District. A statement by 
Citizeness Kh-va accusing the M-v couple of unseemly behavior ("They curse, 
threaten, put garbage in the soup ... ") was being considered. M-v is a young scholar 
- an art specialist. I am his research director, and naturally I am not at all indifferent 
to how he conducts himself in his home life. 
However, what was called a "court" left the most painful and oppressive impression. 
It immediately became clear that the whole fuss between the "parties" had flared up 
because a room had become available in the apartment and had been assigned by the 
district executive committee to the M-vs, while Kh-va demanded that others be put in 
it. But the members of the comrades' court refused to take any notice of this whatever. 
From the very outset, they did not hide their open hostility to the "defendants." No 
proof of misconduct by the M-vs was present. The court became nothing more or less 
than an indecent kitchen scandal, a "domestic spectacle," an inciting of the meanest 
passions. Representatives of the community of the institute at which M-v works were 
hampered when they spoke and were interrupted by interjections such as: "See, he 
found a lawyer," "He's defending his own," "Fine him ten rubles .... " 
The M-vs were found guilty ... of covering their table in the kitchen with a bright 
tablecloth, decorating it with a vase of flowers, hanging on the wall pictures "of 
monuments of old Russian antiquity," and, as the document said: "In this situation, 
Citizeness Kh-va could not make use ofthe kitchen." It would be funny if it were not so 
sad. 
As a consequence, the judges handed down the following decision: "For the unwor-
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4. Decisions 
After a full hearing on the case, during which members of the collective 
voice their opinions both as to the dispute and as to the parties involved,348 the 
court adjourns to decide the issues. Decisions require a majority vote by the 
court members participating in the hearing of the case. 349 The Comrades' 
Court is required to render a statement of the nature of the case, the reasons 
for its decision and the measure of discipline to be enforced,350 or, a statement 
of acquittal of the person brought before the court.351 
Once a Comrades' Court has handed down its decision, the parties must 
comply. In this sense, the decision is self-implementing. Should the parties not 
abide by the decisions, the Comrades' Court can refer the case to the People's 
Court for a check on the legality of the decision.352 If the decision is held to be 
valid, the People's Court is empowered to order execution of the judgment by 
the bailiff. 353 If the ruling is held to be invalid, the People's Court can advise 
the appropriate union committee354 of the defect so that the FZMK can suggest 
a rehearing. 355 When a People's Court orders execution of the Comrades' 
Court's decisions, a concept similar to res Judicata applies and the case may not 
be reheard. 356 Once a Comrades' Court passes judgment, the case may not be 
reheard except in one situation. If the decision is contrary to the facts of the 
thy behavior of the highly educated M -vs to the neighbor sharing the apartment, the 
elderly woman Kh-va, we declare a public censure of the M-vs, to be published in the 
local press and to be sent to their place of employment." 
Judges or Comrades?, supra note 17, at 141-42. For another description of a Comrades' Court hear-
ing, see Zawodny, supra note 27, at 542. 
348. See, e.g., the case of Kh-va accusing the M-vs of unseemly behavior, inJudges or Comrades?, 
supra note 17, at 141-42. 
349. Statute on Comrades' Courts, art. 15, 1977 YEO. RSFSR, no. 12, item 254. The decision of 
the Comrades' Court is not ajudicial act; rather, it is "the application of either a moral or a legal 
norm by society." See V. Igitov, 0 Prirode Mer Vozdeistviia Primeniaemykh Obshchestvennostiu v Oblasti 
Okhrany Obshchestvennogo Poriadka (On the Nature of the Measures of Influence Used by Society in the Area of 
the Defense of the Social Order), SOVETSKOE GOSUOARSTVO I PRAVO, no. 11, 1963, at 112, cited in 
Ramundo, Comrades' Courts, supra note 336, at 31-32. When reaching a decision, a Comrades' 
Court is supposed to be guided by the legislation in force, the Statute on Comrades' Courts, and its 
own sense of public duty. Statute on Comrades' Courts, art. 15, 1977 YEO. RSFSR, no. 12, item 254. 
350. /d. art. 15. The court can demand a public apology of the offender, id. art. 16(1), issue a 
warning to him, id. art. 16(2), issue a social rebuke, id. art. 16(3), or issue a social reprimand in 
writing, id. art. 16(4), and impose a maximum fine often rubles, id. art. 16(5). In extreme cases, 
the court may suggest to management that the worker be transferred to a lower-paying job. /d. 
art. 16(6). 
351. Bashkatov, supra note 323, at 47. 
352. Statute on Comrades' Courts, art. 20, 1977 YEO. RSFSR, no. 12, item 254. 
353. /d. 
354. At enterprises and institutions, the work of the Comrades' Court is guided by the local 
union committee. Bashkatov, supra note 323, at 49. 
355. Statute on Comrades' Courts, art. 20, 1977 YEO. RSFSR, no. 12, item 254. 
356. Ramundo, Comrades' Courts, supra note 336, at 35. 
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case or to the existing legislation, a rehearing may be suggested by the ap-
propriate union or local soviet executive committee. 357 
5." Appeals 
The parties may appeal the decision of the Comrades' Court.358 An appeal 
must be made within seven days from the date on which the Comrades' 
Court; s decision is given. 359 Appeal is taken either to the FZMK or to the ex-
ecutive committee of the local soviet which has the duty of supervising the par-
ticular Comrades' Court.360 Submission of such an appeal automatically halts 
implementation of the decision. 361 The body reviewing the decision has the 
right to cancel that decision and to send the case back to the Comrades' Court 
for a rehearing or for a dismissal of the proceedings. 362 As with any decision of 
the FZMK, either the worker or management may present an appeal to the 
People's Court.363 This ensures "a dependable guarantee of undeviating 
adherence to the laws by the courts in question." 364 
D. The Role of the Procurator 
Along with the quasi-judicial Comrades' Courts, another judicial officer is 
involved in the labor area. Although the Procurator is not named in the labor 
dispute resolution legislation, his responsibility in this area should not be over-
looked. 365 The Procurator holds a position similar to that of an American 
district attorney, 366 with the important difference that the Procurator is not 
357. Statute on Comrades' Courts, art. 20, 1977 VED. RSFSR, no. 12, item 254. 
358. BROWN, supra note 15, at 209. 
359. Bashkatov, supra note 323, at 47. 
360. !d. 
361. !d. at 48. 
362. !d. 
363. See text accompanying notes 235-43, supra. 
364. Bashkatov, supra note 323, at 48. 
365. For example, whenever a labor case is taken to court, a procurator is required to be pres-
ent. JOHNSON, supra note 236, at 201. Also, a considerable percentage of the complaints brought 
to the procurator's office are labor disputes. See Ruble, Factory Workers' Rights, supra note 76, at 
63, citing unpublished Soviet data summarizing the activities of the U.S.S.R. and R.S.F.S.R. 
Procurator. Intervention in labor cases by the procuracy is quite effective in protecting workers. 
See note 383, infra . 
. 366. For a discussion of the Soviet Procuracy, see Boim, "Ombudsmanship" in the Soviet Union, 
22 AM.]. COMPo L. 509, 509-14 (1974) rhereinafter cited as Boim]; Rakitin, Labour Inspection in 
the USSR, 104 INT'L LAB. REV. 289, 302-04 (1971) rhereinafter cited as Rakitinl;]. N. HAZARD, 
I. SHAPIRO & P. MAGGS, THE SOVIET LEGAL SYSTEM 63-65 (1963). 
For a discussion of the role of the procurator in another civil law jurisdiction, France, see R. 
DAVID, FRENCH LAW 59-61 (1972), reprinted inJ. MERRYMAN & D. CLARK, COMPARATIVE LAW: 
WESTERN EUROPEAN AND LATIN AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEMS 498-500 (1978) rhereinafter cited as 
MERRYMAN & CLARK1. In Italy, the equivalent of the procurator is the public attorney. See 
Vigoriti, The Role of the "Ministere Public" in Civil Proceedings: Italy, Italian National Reports to 
the IXth International Congress of Comparative Law, Tehran, at 269-88 (1974), reprinted in 
400 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. IV, No.2 
subordinated to the executive branch of government. 367 The functions of the 
Procurator in the Soviet Union are twofold: (1) to exercise general supervisory 
power over the administration of justice, and (2) to scrutinize the observance 
of law by organs of the State as well as by individual citizens. 368 
The Procurator's role in labor disputes was originally established by an 
order, promulgated by the Attorney General of the U.S.S.R. on May 28, 
1938,369 calling for the exercise of initiative "whenever the interest of the state 
or working masses are involved." 370 The Procurator can accept cases referred 
to him by disgruntled workers either before or after the KTS and FZMK have 
ruled.371 He may argue on the worker's behalf before these bodies, or, he may 
take a neutral, state-interest position. 372 If a People's Court, in a particular 
case, decides that the state's or a worker's rights have been impaired, that 
court is empowered with discretion to invite the Procurator's participation in 
the case. 373 The Procurator may also intervene without an invitation from the 
court.374 Indeed, whenever a labor case goes to court, a Procurator is required 
to be present. 375 The Procurator has the power to appeal a decision of the Peo-
ple's Court to the regional court,376 but his appeal may be rejected by the ap-
pellate court. The Procurator can also appeal decisions of the KTS or FZMK to 
higher organs of the trade unions, thereby bypassing the court entirely. 377 
A Procurator intervenes to protect either the rights of the worker or the 
rights of the State. 378 His function is to assist in making a correct decision, not 
MERRYMAN & CLARK, supra, at 501-07. For the part played by the equivalent of the procurator in 
Germany, see MERRYMAN & CLARK, supra, at 507-08. 
367. The independence of the procuracy is guaranteed by the Soviet constitution. See 
U.S.S.R. CONST. (1977) art. 168. But see Boim, supra note 366, in which the author argues: 
The Prokuratura is neither prepared nor designed - by law, by Party decisions or by its 
own principles or structure of responsibility - to defend the citizen against the State and 
Government even in cases of clear violation of explicit laws or civil rights. As a part of 
the state apparatus, it constitutes an instrument of the regime, not of justice. Like the other 
Soviet state and public institutions, the Prokuratura depends upon the Party in all its ac-
tions, acts under the Party's supervision, and is accountable to the Party for its day-to-
day activities. 
!d. at 511 (emphasis in original). 
368. Fundamental Court Organization, art. 14, 1971 VED. VERKH. Sov. SSSR, no. 33, item 332. 
369. Zawodny, supra note 27, at 543. 
370. !d. 
371. Ruble, Comparison, supra note 130, at 255. 
372. BROWN, supra note 15, at 205. 
373. Zawodny, supra note 27, at 543. 
374. !d. The procurator has the right to institute a civil case in court on behalf of a person, 
even against the will of that person. See Berman, The Educational Role of the Soviet Court, 21 INT'L & 
COMPo L.Q. 81, 85 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Berman, Educational Role]. 
375. JOHNSON, supra note 236, at 201. 
376. He may make this appeal independently of the will of either party. See RSFSR Code of Civil 
Procedure, art. 327, cited in Berman, Educational Role, supra note 374, at 85 n.21. 
377. McAULEY, supra note 19, at 147. 
378. BROWN, supra note 15, at 205. 
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to influence the judge in any way. 379 If the city Procurator believes that the 
local courts have made an incorrect decision, he can request the republic-wide 
Procurator to appeal the case to the republic supreme court.380 This process 
can proceed to the apex of the judicial hierarchy, with the Procurator-General 
of the U.S.S.R. petitioning the Supreme Court of the Soviet Union to review 
a given case. 381 
A Procurator may also impose sanctions on an offender. He may issue warn-
ings, make representations, demand disciplinary or administrative action, 
raise the question of an offender's material liability , or institute criminal pro-
ceedings. 382 . 
The Procurator's potential in resolving conflict between labor and manage-
ment should not be underestimated. 383 However, the Procurator only accepts 
a small percentage of cases brought before him. 384 One rationale, given by the 
Soviets, for this failure to defend vigorously the rights of workers is that there 
are time constraints on the Procuracy which prevent it from adequately 
investigating each case. 385 Another reason given is insufficient training among 
local procurators. 386 Perhaps the best explanation lies in the inherent inability 
of a body, such as the Procuracy, given the Soviet system within which it 
operates, to stand behind an individual in a conflict with the State. 387 
379. JOHNSON, supra note 236, at 202. For a good example of the way a procurator will usually 
conduct himself at an ordinary hearing, see id. at 201-02. 
380. McAULEY, supra note 19, at 243. 
381. !d. 
382. A warning is the most common form of sanction. See Rakitin, supra note 366, at 303. It 
consists of a written document requiring that the infringement in question be remedied. !d. A 
representation is a written instruction by which the appropriate organs or officials are required to 
take specified steps to remove the cause of an illegality and prevent its reoccurrence. !d. 
Disciplinary and administrative action is usually restricted to cases of systematic or gross in-
fringements where there is no basis for criminal proceedings. !d. Should the procurator deter-
mine that a person is materially liable for damage caused by an infringement of the law, he may 
handle the matter by means of a representation or a special order, or may bring an action in a 
subordinate court. !d. at 304. If the procurator determines that an indictable breach of labor 
legislation has occurred, once he has arrived at the full circumstances of the offense, he may im-
mediately institute criminal proceedings by means of an appropriate order. !d. Criminal prosecu-
tion is rare given the plentitude of ways to deal with offenders. !d. 
383. See Ruble, Factory Workers' Rights, supra note 76, at 63, citing unpublished Soviet data sum-
marizing the activities of the U.S.S.R. and R.S.F.S.R. Procurators. In Leningrad, for the year 
of 1961 alone, of 100 civil cases reviewed upon request of the procurator, results favorable to the 
worker were achieved in 98. See McAULEY, supra note 19, at 243 n.2. But criticism ofthe office of 
the procurator has been voiced for his failure to see that a salesman, ordered reinstated by a 
court, was promptly put back to work. The result was that the employee was out of work for 
eleven months. 28 CDSP no. 13, Apr. 28, 1976, at 21, col. 1. 
384. In Leningrad, during the early 1960's, approximately twenty-five to thirty percent of the 
decisions of the People's courts were appealed to the procuracy, but no more than ten were active-
ly pursued by that office per year. See McAULEY, supra note 19, at 243. 
385. !d. at 243 n.l. 
386. Id. at 243. 
387. See note 367, supra. 
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VII. THE QUESTION OF STRIKES 
Generally, when negotiation and arbitration are insufficient to reach agree-
ment on a disputed matter between a worker and his employer, another 
avenue available to the worker is to withhold his labor from his employer. 
Normally, though, a strike is used only as a last resort by workers.388 
The use of the strike weapon by workers to resolve a dispute with manage-
ment occurs in the Soviet Union as it does in other industrial nations. 
However, major differences exist. First, in the Soviet Union, the use of a 
strike by workers in a labor dispute is not considered an acceptable way of 
resolving the conflict.389 Second, because the Soviet Union has a socialist 
economic system with the State having ownership of the means of production, 
any job action by workers against their employer is, in reality, directed at the 
State itself.390 This fact is vitally important because it changes the nature and 
effect of strikes by workers against their socialist employers. What would or-
dinarily be a private matter between an individual group of workers and an in-
dividual employer becomes a very public dispute between workers and the 
State. The very character of the conflict takes on political overtones perceived 
as a challenge by individuals to the legitimacy of the State. The official Soviet 
reaction to, and treatment of strikes is thus the result of ascribing a political 
nature to what is essentially an economic event. 
A. Legality of Strikes 
Nowhere in Soviet legislation is the legality or illegality of strikes men-
tioned. 391 Given the extended nature of the rights expressly protected by the 
Soviet constitution,392 the absence of any mention of the right to strike is illumi-
388. McAuLEY, supra note 19, at 12. 
389. Pravda, supra note 37, at 349-50. 
390. ·BRODERSEN, supra note 15, at 81-82. 
391. Brandt, supra note 27, at 235. 
392. Citizens of the U.S.S.R. have the right to work, U.S.S.R. CONST. (1977) art. 40, the 
right to rest and leisure, id. art. 41, the right to health protection, id. art. 42, the right to 
maintenance in old age, in sickness, and in the event of complete or partial disability or loss of the 
breadwinner, id. art. 43, the right to housing, id. art. 44, the right to education, id. art. 45, the 
right to enjoy cultural benefits, id. art. 46, a guaranteed freedom of scientific, technical, and ar-
tistic work, id. art. 47, the right to take part in the management and administration of state and 
public affairs and in the discussion and adoption oflaws and measures of All-Union and local 
significance, id. art. 48, the right to submit proposals to state bodies and public organizations for 
improving their activity, and to criticize shortcomings in their work, id. art. 49, a guaranteed 
freedom of speech, of the press, and of assembly, meetings, street processions and demonstra-
tions, id. art. 50, the right to associate in public organizations that promote their political activity 
and· initiative and satisfaction of their various interests, id. art. 51, a guaranteed freedom of con-
science, i.e., the right to profess or not to profess any religion, and to conduct religious worship or 
atheistic propaganda, id. art. 52, a guaranteed inviolability of the person, id. art. 54, a 
guaranteed inviolability of the home, id. art. 55, a guaranteed privacy, including that of cor-
respondence, telephone conversations, and telegraphic communications, id. art. 56, and the right 
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nating. The official attitude toward strikes by workers is, perhaps, best summed 
up by a statement made in 1922 during the 11th Congress of the Communist 
Party:39S "[N]either the Communist Party, nor the Soviet Government nor 
uade unions can forget and conceal from the workers. . . that strike action in 
a State with a proletarian government can be explained and justified exclusively 
by bureaucratic deformations of that state and by remnants of capitalism. " 39+ 
Strike~ are not explicidy oudawed in the Soviet Union. They do not need to be 
oudawed because, under Soviet theory, they are impossible: 
According to Soviet theory strikes are not only not legitimate, they 
are by definition inconceivable and cannot happen since the com-
manding authority against which they would ultimately be aimed -
the state itself - is identical with the working class; and for workers 
to strike against themselves would be nonsensical. 395 
The official Soviet attitude is reflected by rhetoric that strikes are ne nado, ne 
mozhno: not necessary, not possible (or permitted). 396 The reason that strikes 
are considered not necessary is that so many other avenues are available to ob-
tain satisfaction that workers simply will not resort to the extreme position of 
calling a strike. A worker can turn to the KTS, FZMK, People's Court or Proc-
urator if he has a problem. Likewise, he can talk out the disagreement with 
management or complain to his union or to the press. Where there are so 
many other ways to get satisfaction, a worker should never need resort to a 
strike. 
B. Causes of Stn'kes 
Whether a strike is necessary or even possible in Soviet theory is im-
material. Strikes do occur in the U.S.S.R.397 The causes of most of the 
reported strikes are economic. 398 For example, lack of adequate supplies of 
consumer goods sparked strikes and riots in the Rostov region of southern 
Russia in 1962.399 Similarly, the shipping of butter abroad, when it was in 
to lodge a complaint against the actions of officials, state bodies and public bodies, id. art. 58. 
However, article 59 of the Soviet constitution states that "Citizens' exercise of their rights and 
freedoms is inseparable from the performance of their duties and obligations." /d. art. 59. The 
duties and obligations of Soviet citizens are outlined in id. arts. 60-69 . 
. 393. This statement was made during the period of the New Economic Policy and the unions 
were allowed more freedom at that time than ever since. See text accompanying notes 98-106, 
supra. This rather extreme attitude is, perhaps, even more meaningful now. 
394. ILO, THE TRADE UNION SITUATION, supra note 105, at 63. 
395. BRODERSEN, supra note 15, at 81-82. This is a "piece of sophistry, but nevertheless a 
crucial Soviet doctrine." [d. at 82. 
396. BROWN, supra note 15, at 233. 
397. See note 3, supra, for a summary of reports of strikes. 
398. See, e.g., table of causes of strikes and riots, by period, in Pravda, supra note 37, at 349. 
399. Boiter, supra note 3, at 37. 
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short supply at home, resulted in strikes in Odessa in 1963. 400 At other times, 
the causes have been similar to those which traditionally have precipitated 
American labor strikes, i. e., low pay, 401 the lowering of the piecework rate,402 
or the disregard for the rights of in-plant union committees. 403 
C. Responses to Strikes 
The response by the authorities to a work stoppage is always swift. If a strike 
is accompanied by rioting, the local militia, often backed by regular army 
troops, is called out to quell any disorders. 404 Where such drastic action is not 
necessary, other tactics are used to alleviate the situation which caused the 
strike. 405 Often, where complaints center on scarce food supplies, adequate 
amounts of what hadjust recently been impossible to locate and purchase sud-
denly appear. 406 Worker complaints about violations of the labor laws are 
often followed by special drives to insure compliance with the law. 407 Similar-
ly, when a reduction in piecework rates sparks the stoppage, such rates are 
often rescinded as a means of remedying the undesirable situation. 408 In one 
case, the workers resumed work only upon the firing of the manager and their 
receipt of supplemental pay. 409 However, the official response has been 
modified in recent years. According to an exiled Soviet labor union leader, 
"rthe] authorities give into the demands of the workers, and later, over a long 
time, they arrest the leaders." 410 By removing the core of discontented 
members of the labor force, the regime seeks to inhibit labor unrest in the 
future. How effective these steps will be in preventing a future strike is an 
open question. 
D. Outlook for the Future of the Strike in the U. S. S. R. 
Although conditions appear to be ripe for widespread labor unrest in the 
400. This strike concerned the shipping of butter to Cuba when there was a shortage in 
Odessa. N.Y. Times, Jun. 25, 1961, at 2, col. 6. 
401. KOLASKY, supra note 3, at 190. 
402. Such a strike led to widespread rioting in Rostov in southern Russia. See id. at 190-93; 
Boiter, supra note 3, at 33-43. 
403. !d. at 37. 
404. KOLASKY, supra note 3, at 191. 
405. BROWN, supra note 15, at 237. 
406. Boiter, supra note 3, at 35. 
407. BROWN, supra note 15, at 235. 
408. Boiter, supra note 3, at 38. 
409. BROWN, supra note 15, at 234. Other tactics employed by the authorities include: strict in-
structions to local party, government and trade union organs to correct the mistakes and short-
comings which gav .. rise to the unrest, Roiter, supra note 3, at 35; denunciation in the press of 
callous officials (usually unnamed) for such things as the poor food supply, disregard of labor 
laws, poor housing conditions, or whatever the specific situation involved, id.; dispatch of a high 
Communist Party official for on-the-spot investigation, id.; or dismissal of one or more officials 
either as the real culprits or as scapegoats. !d. 
410. Boston Globe, Mar. 16, 1981, at 9, col. 1. 
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U.S.S.R.,411 it is not clear whether there will be any such unrest at all,412 nor 
whether strikes similar to those in Poland would be successful in winning the 
workers' demands. In the first place, workers in the U.S.S.R. have great dif-
ficulties in organizing. Many workers feel isolated and are afraid of each 
other,413 as the system pits individuals against one another. 414 The story of one 
worker who tried to protest unsafe working conditions is illustrative of the 
problems facing workers who try to organize and to demand changes from the 
authorities. 
In 1969, Aleksei Netytin, a mining engineer and Communist Party 
member, led a protest over dangerous working conditions in the mines of 
Donetsk.41 5 The petition was ignored, Netytin was fired and the other workers 
were forced to renounce their signatures. 416 Netytin went to the Norwegian 
Embassy in Moscow with an appeal to the International Labor 
Organization. 417 He was arrested, declared insane and put in a psychiatric 
hospital for eleven years.41 8 Upon his release in 1980, Netytin went to see a 
psychiatrist who is a member of a group investigating the abuse of psychiatry 
in the Soviet Union. This doctor, Anatoly Koryargin, pronounced Netytin 
completely sane. 419 Netytin then arranged for foreign correspondents to meet 
the miners in Donetsk. These workers complained about the conditions both 
in the mines and in general. Three days after the meeting between the 
foreigners and the miners, Netytin was again arrested. 420 He has since been 
returned to a psychiatric hospital. 
Also illustrative of the probable official attitude toward; and reaction to, a 
future strike is the response to a free, independent trade union which came in-
to existence in January, 1978. The Charter of the Free Trade Union Associa-
tion of Soviet Workers422 was signed in Moscow on February 1, 1978. 423 The 
Charter was signed by one hundred and ten people, and a note was added that 
"there are a number of other colleagues who have asked that for the time be-
ing their names be withheld." 424 This organization was closed down by the 
411. See broadcast by Anne Garrels on ABC, WORLD NEWS TONIGHT, Feb. 6, 1981 [herein-
after cited as ABC]. 
412. One expert predicts relative stability, at least for the 1980's. See Smith, Will Soviet Workers 
"Take to the Streets" in the '~O's? 89 U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Aug. 11, 1980, at 46-47. 








421. NEWSWEEK, Nov. 9, 1981, at 29. 
422. J. JOYCE, WORLD LABOR RIGHTS AND THEIR PROTECTION 178 (1980). 
423. AFL-CIO News, May, 1978, cited in id. 
424. !d. at 178-80. 
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authorities and its leaders either put in jails or in psychiatric hospitals. m The 
successor to the Free Trade Union Association of Soviet Workers was the Free 
Interprofessional Association of Workers (SM01)426 which likewise was 
eliminated by the regime. 427 
At the outset, a strike may appear to win the workers' demands from the 
government. Given the new Soviet response to strikes, however, such a vic-
tory may be pyrrhic. If the authorities methodically remove the leadership 
from among the workers, in theory there will be no one to direct the workers in 
the future. The workers might find themselves in a worse situation than that in 
which they started. Seeing these tactics used by the authorities, the worker is 
not at all certain that only the strike leaders will be hurt. The reaction to 
strikes in the past has often been brutal. 428 A fear among the workers exists 
that any job action in the future will bring similar results.429 
E. Effect of the Recent Labor Unrest in Poland on Soviet Workers 
The degree and extent to which Soviet workers have been affected by the 
events in Poland since August, 1980 remain unclear. Soviet workers are cer-
tainly aware of these events. A number of miners interviewed by one western 
correspondent admitted knowledge of the situation in Poland, but also ex-
pressed fear at the thought of supporting their Polish brothers. 43o Contacts 
have been reported between the Polish free trade union, Solidarity, and the 
two-hundred-member Soviet free trade union. 431 This awareness among 
Soviet workers causes many analysts of the situation to believe that the Soviet 
leaders are contemplating an invasion of Poland. The Soviets state that their 
concern is to stabilize the situation in Poland, but history shows that the true 
Soviet goal may be to crush the free union movement both in Poland and 
within the U.S.S.R.432 Free union activity in the Soviet Union corresponds to 
periods ofliberalization in sister socialist states, m the last high point occurring 
during the "Prague Spring" of 1968.434 After the Warsaw Pact invasion of 
Cze~hoslovakia in August, 1968, the union movement in the U.S.S.R. declined 
sharply.435 A crushing of Solidarity in Poland would therefore probably mean 
425. AFL-CIO News, Oct. 6, 1979, at 1, col. 2. 
426. !d. 
427. AFL-CIO News, Sept. 22, 1979, at 8, col. 1. 
428. For example, the army was called out to quell the disorders in the Rostov area in 1962. 
There were a number of persons killed, including boys who had climbed trees to get a better view 
of the square in which the workers were demonstrating. Boston Globe, Mar. 16,1981, at 9, col. 1. 
429. ABC, supra note 41l. 
430. [d . 
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a similar crushing of the free union movement inside the Soviet Union. 436 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
In theory, there can be no disagreement between a worker and his employer 
under socialism because the worker owns the means of production and, hence, 
is his own employer. However, legitimate disputes between labor and 
management do occur in the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union has developed 
an elaborate system for resolving grievance disputes, but this system is designed 
to resolve only a limited type of dispute. All other disagreements must be settled 
outside the normal channels, through informal negotiation or through the ap-
plication of pressure from superiors in the governmental bureaucracy on the 
parties to the dispute. Both management and the trade unions, the two bodies 
most often involved in labor disputes, play roles under socialism quite dif-
ferent from those of their counterparts under capitalism. Management, being 
part of the state apparatus, must further the state's goals of increased produc-
tion. Likewise, the unions playa dual role by protecting certain rights and in-
terests of their workers while, at the same time, spurring production. 
The Soviet Union has established three separate agencies to hear labor 
cases. Two of these bodies exist in the workplace itself and are composed in 
whole, or in part, of workers. The goal of these two bodies is to clear up any 
misunderstanding which is causing a problem. The People's Court is the third 
agency to hear labor disputes. This court is located on the lowest tier of the 
general court system. Important cases are brought to the People's Courts so 
that a correct reading of Soviet legislation can be applied to the situation and 
all the rights of the workers can be protected. Also, a worker can turn to other 
institutions. Most notable among these latter bodies are the newspapers. Bad 
publicity can serve as a powerful stimulus for action on the part of manage-
ment. Another agency is the Comrades' Court, a group of persons drawn 
from a collective, which uses peer pressure and moral persuasion to discipline 
workers. Finally, the Procurator may intervene to insure a proper result. 
A strike never has been accepted by Soviet authorities as a legitimate means 
of resolving a dispute between labor and management. When strikes occur, 
they are most often sparked by economic concerns among the workers. The of-
ficial reaction has been both swift and harsh, but evidence indicates that tactics 
are changing. 
The recent events in Poland have not gone unnoticed nor unheeded by 
Soviet workers. Many of the underlying causes of the unrest in Poland exist in 
the Soviet Union. However, institutional inhibitions exist against organizing 
to protest bad working conditions. Because of these mechanisms, an aggrieved 
436. This is the fear among certain Soviet labor leaders. See id. 
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worker is limited in his choice of ways of settling his dispute with manage-
ment. This is likely to continue at least into the near future. The Soviet worker 
is not able, as his Polish brothers have been, to unite with his fellows to force 
change on the government through collective protest. 
The costs to the workers of not being able to use their most powerful weapon 
is a loss of certain freedoms and perhaps a lower standard ofliving. The cost to 
the regime, however, of allowing such collective protest, potentially could be 
widespread labor unrest. This is a cost not likely to be risked by the Soviet 
Union's leadership at this or any time, since such unrest would make the 
U.S.S.R. itself the most dangerous country in the eastern bloc to the Soviet 
overlords. According to one Soviet labor leader: "One can always invade a 
country like Hungary, Czechoslovakia or Poland. But one can be sure no one 
will invade the Soviet Union to settle labor disputes. So, from that point of 
view, it is the most dangerous country." 437 
John A. Herbers 
437. Vladimir Borisov, in an interview in Boston Globe, Mar. 16, 1981, at 9, col. 1. 
